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The market for public-private contracting is huge and flawed.  
Privatization proponents predict that privatizing will both cut costs and 
improve service quality.  But public-private contracts for services such as 
prisons and welfare administration tend to result in cost savings at the 
sacrifice of quality service.  For instance, to cut costs, private prisons skimp 
on security.  Public law scholars have studied these problems for decades 
and have proposed various public law solutions.  But the literature is 
incomplete because it does not approach the problem through a commercial 
lens.  This Article fills that gap by applying contract theory principles to 
public-private contracting.   
 
It argues that certain categories of public-private contracts are 
subject to systematic biases that cause the parties to impose a cost on 
service recipients in the form of low quality service.  Because there is a 
limited competitive market for these services, the contracting parties are not 
forced to internalize these costs.  As a result, contracts tend to be 
underpriced.  Thus, what appears to be a cost-saving mechanism is often, in 
fact, a systematic market failure.  
 
This Article proposes a counterintuitive solution grounded in 
contract theory and doctrine to force the parties to internalize the cost of 
poor service provision.  It suggests reading into public-private contracts a 
mandatory duty to act in furtherance of the public interest.  Although 
efficiency theory assumes that mandatory restrictions on contracting parties 
are inefficient, a mandatory rule is justified, here, because the law must 
protect non-parties to the contract who cannot adequately protect 
themselves.  The Article also suggests that third-party service beneficiaries 
should be permitted to sue to enforce such contracts.     
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Public-private contracting is big business.  Over a quarter of local 
government services are now provided to some degree by private entities.
1
  
And state governments’ use of privatization is on the rise.
2
  While most 
sectors of the economy have struggled since 2008, government contracting 
is seeing growth rates in the double digits.
3
  Governments now contract with 









 and provide military services
8
 and 
                                                 
1
 See Mildred Warner & Amir Hefetz, Cooperative Competition: Alternative Service 
Delivery, 2002–2007, The Mun. Y.B. 11, 14 (2009) (reporting private entities responsible 
for more than 25% of local or municipal service delivery).   
2
 There is a dearth of empirical evidence on trends in state-level privatization, but some 
studies have indicated increased privatization.  See, e.g., John D. Donahue, The 
Transformation of Government Work: Causes, Consequences, and Distortions, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 47-48 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT] (citing a study by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis from 1950 through 2005, and noting that “[s]tate and local outsourcing starts low 
and grows steadily but modestly.”); William M. Bulkeley, Glitches Mar Indiana's Effort to 
Outsource Social Services, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL A4 (August 12, 2009) (citing 
report finding “state-government outsourcing business will amount to about $8.8 billion in 
revenue this year, and predict[ing] it will grow 5% annually to $11.2 billion in 2014.”).  
There is a wealth of anecdotal evidence that state-level privatization is increasing.  See, 
e.g., Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 8 
(Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (“the clear trend over the last few decades, at 
all levels of government, is toward outsourcing.”); E.S. Savas, Privatization in State and 
Local Government, in RESTRUCTURING STATE AND LOCAL SERVICES: IDEAS, PROPOSALS, 
AND EXPERIMENTS 91 (Arnold H. Raphaelson ed., Greenwood Publishing Group 1998) 
(“Privatization of state and local government services is widespread and growing.”); III. A 
Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 1868 (2002) (“Private prisons are on the rise.”). 
3
 The State of the Government Contractor Industry: 2010 (published by Grant Thorton 
2010), available at  
http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Government%20contractors/Government%20contra
ctor%20files/GovConRdtble2010FINALpdf.pdf  (in 2009, government contracting industry 
grew 12% over the past year); see also GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 6 
(“During fiscal year 2006, federal agencies spent over $400 billion on procurement of 
goods and services from private firms, an increase of almost 90 percent since 2000.”). 
4
 Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private[ized] Entities, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1726 (2002).    
5
 Id.; Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 155, 160–63 
(2000) [hereinafter The Contracting State]; Paul Howard Morris, Note, The Impact of 
Constitutional Liability on the Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 489, 494 (1999). 
6
 Daniela Caruso, Contract Law and Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform, 49 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 665, 670 n.9 (2007). 
7
 Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2002) (discussing the privatization of Florida’s public assistance 
program for needy families). 
8
 Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 





 among myriad other examples.  Public-private contracting 
has continued to gain favor during the recent recession in part as an answer 
to state budgetary problems.
10 
  
The attractiveness and success of privatization
11
 derive from its 
presumed ability to reduce the costs of providing government services while 
maintaining or ideally improving quality.  Yet time has shown that 
government efforts to save costs, for certain types of contracts, often come 
at the expense of service quality.
12
  For instance, New Jersey contracted 
with a private company to run halfway houses for the state.  The fee to 
house an inmate in a private halfway house is half what it costs to keep an 
inmate in a state prison.
13
  But to cut costs and maximize profits, private 
companies skimp on security and inmates regularly escape and commit 
further violent crimes, or are raped or killed at private halfway houses.
14
   
In another example, IBM entered into a $1.34 billion, ten-year deal 
with the state of Indiana to administer public benefits programs.
15
  The deal 
was supposed to save Indiana $500 million,
16
 but the contract collapsed in 
2009.
17
  Beneficiaries now allege that, because IBM wrongly denied 
Medicaid benefits or caused lapses in benefits, they were unable to buy 
crucial medications or receive life-sustaining medical procedures.
18
  One 
mother even claims that after her son was wrongly denied benefits and 
could not afford his anti-psychotic medication, he gouged her eyes out in a 
schizophrenic fit.
 19
  These examples are not isolated.
20
   
                                                                                                                            
N.C. L. REV. 397, 436–37 (2006). 
9
 GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 2. 
10
 Outsourcing helps states address budgetary issues through cost-savings and sometimes in 
delaying payments.  See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1965 (2011) (discussing Chicago’s decision to lease its parking meters). 
11
 The terms “public-private contracting,” “government outsourcing,” “privatizing,” and 
“contracting out,” mean different things in different contexts.  But for purposes of this 
Article, they are used interchangeably to indicate a contract between a governmental entity 
and a private party, where the private party agrees to provide a government service for the 
benefit of the public in exchange for compensation by the government. 
12
 This Article does not suggest that these agreements always fail.  Undoubtedly, there are 
successes.  It simply suggests ways that contract law can ameliorate the most common 
causes of the failures.   
13












 See Gibson v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 1:10-CV-00330-LJM, 2011 WL 4402599 (S.D. 
Ind. Sept. 22, 2011). 
19
 Land v. Int'l Bus. Machines, Inc., 11-3450, 2012 WL 2355590 (7th Cir. June 21, 2012) 
(affirming dismissal of claims because “[a]lthough there is no denying that Land suffered a 
wrong, it is not one for which federal law provides a remedy). 
20
 See Part I(C), infra. 
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Indeed, public-private contracting is a pervasive endeavor that has 
attracted much scholarly attention from public law scholars in recent 
decades.
21
  For instance, Martha Minow and Jody Freeman recently 
suggested that: 
 
Our current government contracting system does not work. It 
is largely invisible and unresponsive to the public in whose 
name it is undertaken. The existing rules and procedures fail 
to guard adequately against inefficiency, conflict of interest, 
and abuse. And much of the power being exercised through 
contracting is largely unaccountable to any regime of 




In general, public law scholars focus on problems of democratic process 
and accountability and propose various administrative law and Constitution-
based solutions to public-private contracting problems.
23
  The prevailing 
sentiment in the academic literature is that private, profit-maximizing firms 
should not be entrusted with providing government services absent 
safeguards because profit-maximizing goals conflict with public service 
values.  Nonetheless, privatization continues. 
Public law scholars have made important contributions to the 
literature, but their arguments are incomplete because they do not consider 
the problem through a commercial—or more specifically a contract 
theory—lens.
24
  Commercial law scholars, for their part, have largely 
                                                 
21
 For a thorough account of the existing privatization literature, see Chris Sagers, The 
Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 42-56 (2007).  See also supra notes 4-8; 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 2; Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, 
Due Process, and the Duty To Supervise, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2, at 
291; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in Administrative Law, 
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2, at 261; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law 
Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1317–20, 1342 (2003) [hereinafter 
Extending Public Law Norms]; Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of 
Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 641–42 (2001) [hereinafter Privatized Welfare]; 
Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L.J. 389 (2003); Janna J. 
Hansen, Note, Limits of Competition: Accountability in Government Contracting, 112 
YALE L.J. 2465, 2475 (2003); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: 
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1267 (2003); Dru Stevenson, 








 Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The 
Case of Housing, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 263, 279 (2006) (promoting the use of 
relational contract methods in public-private contracting); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in 
the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related 
Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 293–95 (1995) (arguing 
that restrictive contract doctrines should be used to preclude enforcement of socially costly 
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ignored public-private contracting, focusing instead on commercial 
interactions between firms or contracts between individuals.
25
  This Article 
bridges the gap between public and commercial law in the universe of 
public-private contracting by considering how economic analysis of 
contract law
26
 bears upon the unique problems of public-private contracting.  
It argues that certain types of public-private contracts do not function like 
standard commercial agreements and the law (and the contracting parties) 
should recognize this.   
First, the government lacks the proper incentives to ensure high 
quality service provision.  This is particularly true where the service in 
question “benefits” the disenfranchised in society such as criminals and the 
poor who have no economic power (as a commercial customer would) and 
limited political power.  Also, budget and resource pressure often account 
for the decision to outsource in the first place, meaning that governments 
are likely (and sometimes obligated) to accept the lowest bid for a project 
without regard to quality.  These problems are likely to be worse in public-
private contracting than direct service provision because by outsourcing, 
governments buy the right to point the finger at the private party if service 
provision is poor.  Also, private actors may be motivated by profit 
maximization goals more so than government workers providing the same 
services.
27
     
Second, even if the government were incentivized to provide high 
quality service, it faces systematic difficulties in doing so.  Although 
advocates of privatization herald the move from state-run monopoly to a 
                                                                                                                            
contracts). 
25
 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 619 (2003) [hereinafter Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law].   
26
 This Article views public-private contracting through the efficiency lens, as augmented 
by behavioral law and economics, which studies how people make boundedly rational 
choices.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 1 
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1051, 1054–55 (2000).  For a good, high-level discussion of other approaches to 
contract theory, see generally Stephen A. Smith, CONTRACT THEORY, (Oxford University 
Press 2004).  See also Part II, infra.  It also considers the implications of agency theory.  
See, e.g., A. A. Berle. and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(Macmillan, New York, 1932); Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976).  Transaction cost economics is a related concept that focuses on incentive systems 
and governance mechanisms in the face of competing goals amongst the parties.  See, e.g., 
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 233 (1979). 
27
 It is for this reason that private service provision is likely to result in lower quality than 
direct government provision, although this an empirical question to which there is currently 
no clear answer.  For a further discussion of how outsourcing may differ from direct 
government service provision, see Part III(B), infra. 
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competitive market, the reality is that in certain types of public-private 
contracting, the seller-side market is shallow.  For instance, very few 
entities are positioned to provide such complex and sophisticated services 
as administering Medicaid for a state or running a prison, which have no 
commercial analogs.  Therefore contracts do not benefit from the 
competitive effects of an efficient market.  In addition, many government 
services are difficult to specify and monitor—at least quality is difficult to 
specify and monitor.  Cost-savings are somewhat easier to detect.  But 
despite best efforts, contracts are inherently incomplete.  Even if a party can 
specify performance metrics, it may get just what it asked for, sacrificing 
compliance with higher-level goals.   
These two systematic biases cause the transacting parties to impose 
a cost on service recipients in the form of low quality service.  As a result 
(putting aside potential bargaining problems), contracts are underpriced.  
Thus, what appears to be a cost-saving mechanism is instead a systematic 
market failure.  Absent competitive market mechanisms, the contracting 
parties are not forced to internalize these costs.  This Article proposes a 
counterintuitive solution grounded in contract theory and doctrine to force 
the parties to internalize the cost of poor service provision: reading a 
mandatory duty into public-private contracts.   
Economists argue that when the assumptions of the typical private 
business transaction are in place, contract law should have default rules that 
parties can contract around—not mandatory rules.
28
  This Article suggests 
the opposite for public-private contracting.  To combat the problem that the 
government is not incentivized to care about poor service (and nor is the 
private, profit-maximizing provider), the transacting parties should be 
subject to a mandatory duty to act in furtherance of the public interest.  
Essentially, the parties should be prohibited from imposing a cost on the 
public in the form of poor service.  The rule would function like a 
heightened good faith and fair dealing requirement.  Beneficiaries of the 
service should be permitted to sue to enforce the duty.  Although 
conventional economic wisdom is that mandatory standards are undesirable 
because they hinder bargaining to efficient outcomes, that logic does not 
apply where there are market failures and contracts do not account for costs 
imposed on third-parties who cannot protect themselves.
29
     
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes public-private 
contracts for the provision of traditional government services and gives 
                                                 
28
 Id.; see also Alan Schwartz, Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE 
L.J. 926 (2010). 
29
 It may be more intuitive to think about beneficiaries (i.e. prisoners in the New Jersey 
example or welfare beneficiaries in the Indiana example) as the principal to the government 
as agent.  I would argue, however, that the voters or taxpayers are a better proxy for the 
“principal” and that the beneficiaries, who in my examples are unlikely to be paying taxes 
other than sales tax and probably represent a small percentage of the voting population, are 
more like customers who lack the conventional market power we attribute to customers. 
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examples of two high-profile failures where cost savings were achieved at 
the expense of quality service provision.  Part II explores the economic 
model of contracting, and in particular efficiency theory and agency theory, 
in the context of the traditional firm-firm commercial transaction.  Part III 
then considers the problems in public-private contracting through an 
economic lens.  It emphasizes that governments privatize to take advantage 
of market forces and expect that their contracts will function similarly to 
firm-firm commercial agreements.  However, the major assumptions of 
efficiency theory and agency theory conceived with a commercial 
transaction in mind do not apply to public-private contracts.  Rather, poor 
markets, agency costs, misaligned incentives, and complicated service 
models that defy precise definition result in a systematic bias.  Parties write 
contracts that reduce price but sacrifice quality.  Finally, Part IV suggests a 
possible solution to mitigate these problems: reading into these contracts a 
mandatory duty to act in furtherance of the public interest.  This solution, 
although not perfect, encourages the parties to internalize the costs of poor 
service delivery. 
I. Contracts for the Provision of Government Services 
Proponents of government outsourcing argue that it is more efficient 
and cost-effective
30
 than government provision of the same services.
31
  
Governments function loosely as a monopoly and lack the incentive to 
innovate to save cost.  By introducing competition, so the argument goes, 
private firms are motivated to deliver services efficiently and effectively.  In 
addition, whereas the government must negotiate a considerable 
bureaucracy, private entities have more flexibility to adjust staffing and 
wage levels and to utilize private capital as necessary.
32
  Privatization 
proponents conceive of public-private contracting similarly to commercial 
contracting and expect that governments can take advantage of market 
mechanisms at play in commercial transactions. 
                                                 
30
 There have been many studies but no consensus on whether privatization actually cuts 
costs.  See Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of 
Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149 at 150-51 (2010) (“studies have found that private 
prisons may reduce the cost of housing inmates by as much as 15% . . . [but] the cost-
saving claim remains controversial. Some researchers have observed that private prison 
contractors typically siphon off the least costly inmates-those who are healthier and less 
violent than the incarcerated population as a whole.  More generally, simple cost 
comparisons that appear to favor private facilities are based on per diem rates that may not 
reflect the full cost of incarceration.”) (internal citations omitted). 
31
 See, e.g., E.S. Savas, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT (1987); David 
A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL L REV 393, 400 (2008). 
32
 Id.; see also E.S. Savas, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 188 at 
111-12 (2000); David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 250-79 (1992). 
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Criticism of public-private contracting, however, is widespread.  
Scholars condemn the efficacy of privatization, the failure of private 
providers to comply with democratic norms, and the lack of accountability 
and transparency in public-private contracting.
33
  
Not all types of contracting out are subject to these criticisms.  The 
public management literature distinguishes two types of government 
outsourcing contracts (focusing on state and local-level contracting):
 34
 
those for “soft” government services and those for “hard” government 
services.
35
  Hard services are those that are easy to specify, involve little 
discretion, and where delegation causes minimal transaction costs.  
Examples include garbage collection, fire protection, or road construction.
 36
 
If a company fails to collect garbage on the designated days, the failure 
would be easy to detect.  Almost all local governments contract with private 
parties to provide hard services to some degree.   
Soft services are those in which people are the service focus.
37
 Soft 
services tend to be more difficult to define and measure and involve 
discretion.  Soft services have been called complex human services, and 
include running prisons, administering welfare benefits, and providing 
education.  In contrast to hard services, specifying how to run a prison is 
much more complicated.  It involves issues of security, health care, 
rehabilitation, etc.  It is also much more difficult for the government to 
know when service provision falters.   
Hard and soft government services also typically differ with respect 
to the extent of their public reach.  It tends to be true that soft services are 
more likely to affect a narrow, disenfranchised segment of the population—
for instance the poor in the case of welfare benefits or criminals in the case 
                                                 
33
 See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2. 
34
 This Article focuses on state and local level outsourcing because such contracts are, for 
the most part, subject to the same doctrinal contract rules as commercial contracting.  See 
Caruso, supra note 6 at 669-670.  It does not address federal government contracting or 
procurement, which are highly legislated by Congress and regulated by agencies.  See, e.g., 
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) § 2711, Pub L No 98-369, 98 Stat 1175, 
1175-81, codified at 41 USC § 253 (containing competition requirements for government 
procurement procedures).  In addition, claims involving federal contracts are generally 
resolved in the Court of Federal Claims.  Therefore, “tribunals deciding government 
contracts cases and those deciding common law contracts cases most frequently work 
without cross-pollination.”  56 MD. L. REV. at 556-57.   
35
 See, e.g., Anna Amirkhanyan, Collaborative performance measurement: Examining and 
explaining the relevance of collaboration in state and local government contracts, 
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 19 (3) at 523-54 (2009); 
Meeyoung Lamothe and Scott Lamothe, What Determines the Formal Versus Relational 
Nature of Local Government Contracting?, URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW  48 (3) at 322-353 
(2012). 
36
 For more examples of hard vs. soft government services, see Lamothe, supra note 35 at 
App. A.   
37
 Id., see also Ruth Hoogland DeHoog, Competition, negotiation, or cooperation: Three 
models for service contracting. ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY 22 (3) at 317-40 (1990). 
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of prisons—whereas hard services are more likely to affect the whole 
population.  Garbage collection and road construction benefit essentially 
everyone in a community.   
The differences in these types or categories of services matter in 
meaningful ways.  As Part III will explain in more detail, outsourcing of 
soft government services tends to be more problematic than outsourcing of 
hard government services.
38
  With soft services, markets tend to be 
shallower, tasks are harder to specify, and the ability of beneficiaries to 
exert pressure to force good service is more limited than with hard 
services.
39
  Nonetheless, there has been a rise in government outsourcing of 
soft government services in the past decade.
40
   
The two examples that follow lay the groundwork for the types of 
problems these public-private contracts for the provision of traditional (soft) 
government services often face. 
A. Prison Example: The New Jersey-Community Education 
Centers Contract  
In the late 1990s, New Jersey contracted with Community Education 
Centers (“CEC”), a private company, to provide halfway house services (a 
“soft” government service).
41
  The contract requires CEC to establish 
facilities to house inmates released early from New Jersey prisons.
42
  It also 
requires that CEC provide various services to assimilate inmates back into 
society.
43
  The term halfway “houses” is a bit misleading.  The facilities can 
                                                 
38
 See Sergio Fernandez, Accounting for Performance in Contracting for Services: Are 
Successful Contractual Relationships Controlled or Managed?, Paper presented at the 8th 
Public Management Research Conference, Los Angeles, California, and hosted by the 
School of Policy, Planning, and Development at the University of Southern California, 
September 29 to October 1, 2005, at 11. (“Previous research indicates a higher incidence of 
performance problems when contracting for “soft” services, such as public safety and 
human services, which typically involve more complex processes and technologies and 
which can be more difficult to specify and measure.”). 
39
 See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 2 (arguing that contracts for run-of-
the-mill supplies and commercial services “may pose few problems”).  Also, John Donahue 
uses a different vocabulary but makes a similar point.  He defines “commodity tasks” as 
ones that are “well defined, relatively easy to evaluate, and available from competitive 
private suppliers . . . .”  He contrasts commodity tasks with “custom tasks.”  Ultimately, he 
argues that commodity tasks are more suitable for outsourcing than custom tasks.  See 
Donohue, supra note 2 at 49.  
40
 See supra notes 1-3. 
41
 See Sam Dolnick, As Escapees Stream Out, A Penal Business Thrives, THE NEW YORK 






 See Sam Dolnick, At A Half-Way House, Bedlam Reigns, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 
17, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/nyregion/at-bo-robinson-a-
halfway-house-in-new-jersey-bedlam-reigns.html?_r=1&smid=fb-share. 
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have as many as 1200 beds, making them as big as prisons.  And roughly 40 
percent of New Jersey’s state prison population passes through the system 
of private halfway houses.
44
   
CEC is compensated by a flat fee per inmate per day housed that 
amounts to roughly half the cost of housing inmates in state prisons.
45
  The 
contract thus reduces prison costs.  In addition, by freeing beds in the state 
prisons, those prisons can rent beds to the federal government to house 
federal inmates and immigration detainees, which raises revenue.  One New 
Jersey county receives $108 per day for each bed in their jail the federal 
government uses, and spends $73 per day for a bed at a CEC half-way 
house.
46
  It keeps the difference.
47
   
The New York Times recently published a series of articles following 
a ten-month investigation of these private halfway houses.  They labeled the 
halfway houses as “at the vanguard of a national movement to privatize 
correctional facilities.”
48
  But they reported that the halfway houses “seem[] 
to embody the worst in the prisons [they were] intended to supplant.”
49
   
First, there are not enough guards or sufficient security.  Although 
inmates have more freedom in halfway houses than prisons, state law still 
emphasizes that these facilities must be secure.
50
  Because of lax security, 
gang activity is high and escapes occur too frequently.
51
  The New York 
Times reports that “[s]ince 2005, roughly 5,100 inmates have escaped from 
the state’s privately run halfway houses.”
52
  Some escapees have gone on to 
commit gruesome crimes.  One halfway house escapee who was jailed for 
assaulting a former girlfriend escaped and immediately killed another young 
                                                 
44
 See Dolnick, supra note 41. 
45
 See Dolnick, supra note 41. 
46
 See Sam Dolnick, A Volatile Mix Fuels A Murder, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 18, 
2012, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/nyregion/at-a-new-jersey-halfway-house-a-volatile-
mix-fuels-a-murder.html?ref=unlocked (noting that about 40 percent of that county’s jail 








 State of New Jersey, Office of the State Comptroller, State Comptroller audit exposes 
crucial weaknesses in state oversight of inmate halfway houses (June 15, 2011) (“Despite 
emphasis in state law on ensuring the security of these facilities, DOC officials were unable 
to provide a precise total of escapes over that time period for all halfway house facilities.”), 
available at: http://www.nj.gov/comptroller/news/docs/doc_pr.pdf. 
51
 See Dolnick, supra note 41. 
52
 The New York Times compares this number to escapees from state prisons.  The author 
states that the “the state’s prisons had three escapes in 2010 and none in the first nine 
months of 2011, the last period for which the state gave figures.”  See Dolnick, supra note 
41.  A more apt comparison would be between privately run halfway houses and state-run 
halfway houses, but such data is not readily available.  It is therefore difficult to assess 
what this number means in the abstract, other than to say that the number sounds high for 
what is supposed to be a secure facility.    





  Another inmate imprisoned for drugs and weapons charges 
escaped and went on to kill a man just three miles from the halfway house.
54
   
Second, the counseling services that New Jersey pays for are not 
being provided.
55
  Workers falsify inmate records and management does 
nothing despite seeing case file after case file with identical records. 
Third, the halfway houses were originally designed to house and 
rehabilitate only non-violent offenders.
56
  But low-level offenders are now 
thrown in with violent offenders.  One non-violent offender was recently 
murdered by a convict with a violent history in a CEC halfway house.
57
   
The reasons for these breakdowns are undoubtedly complicated, but 
one issue is clear.  Contracting out for this service has not solved the 
problems that plague government-run prisons as privatization theory 
predicts.
58
  To maximize profit, CEC is incentivized to house as many 
inmates as possible in its facility at any given point in time.  It also has the 
incentive to keep its costs as low as possible.
59
  Therefore, it operates 
without enough staff or adequate security.   
Additionally, as the state comptroller determined in an audit last 
year, state oversight and monitoring of the program have been lacking:
60
  
[A]s a state we have done a poor job of monitoring the 
program and have made no real attempt to find out what 
taxpayers are getting for their money. It is critical that the 
state takes a more active role in ensuring the success of these 
programs. It cannot simply cut these halfway houses a check 
and hope for the best.
61
 
Poor monitoring likely means that the government did not know the 
extent of the problems prior to the New York Times expose, which reports 
that when CEC “gave tours of Bo Robinson to officials or potential 
investors, everything was staged. Hallways were scrubbed and painted. 
Visitors were kept far from the men’s units, the rowdiest areas.”
62
 
                                                 
53




 See Dolnick, supra note 43 (“The government requires that Bo Robinson provide 
therapy, job training and other services, but current and former workers said they had 
neither the skills nor the time to do so.”). 
56




 For further comparison of direct service provision with private contractor provision, see 
Part III(A)(3), infra. 
59
 See Dolnick, supra note 43 (“Community Education made money not on how many 
people they rehabilitated. ‘How many bodies can we get in here and keep here for a certain 
amount of time?’ — that’s what they were interested in.”).   
60




 See Dolnick, supra note 43. 
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If New Jersey entered into the contract believing it would save 
money and CEC would provide high-quality service, this has not occurred.  




B. Welfare Example: The Indiana-IBM Contract 
State and local governments have long relied on private actors to 
provide welfare services,
64
 but there has been a dramatic increase in the last 
two decades.
65
  Notably, in 1996, Congress enacted the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).
66
 
The Act, part of the “reinvent government” movement, explicitly provided 
that a state can administer its welfare programs “through contracts with 
charitable, religious, or private organizations.”
67
  Accordingly, state and 
local governments turned to the private sector to provide a range of (soft) 
government services.   
Indiana had an antiquated and highly inefficient welfare system, 
thought to be one of the worst in the nation, with high error rates, long 
customer wait times, onerous in-person appearance requirements, and high 
rates of fraud.
68
  In 2006, Indiana’s Family and Social Services 
Administration (“FSSA”) signed a $1.37 billion, ten-year contract with IBM 
to revamp, modernize, and take over the application process and general 
administration of the system.
69
  Under the terms of the agreement, IBM was 
to automate components of a system that were previously caseworker-
based.  It also had “the day-to-day responsibilities of working with 
beneficiaries to determine their eligibility and process their appeals.”
70
  The 
contract required IBM’s subcontractor to hire the former state caseworkers 
                                                 
63
 Some may argue that by privatizing, the government knows it will receive lower quality 
in return for reduced cost, but that view is at odds with privatization theory.  This issue is 
addressed further in Part III(A), infra.  
64
 See Catherine Donnelly, Privatization and Welfare: A Comparative Perspective, 5 LAW 
& ETHICS HUM. RTS. 336, 339 (2011) (using a comparative approach to discuss challenges 
to accountability and human rights that arise from using privatization in the welfare 
context). 
65
 See Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power Reconfiguring 
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 278-81 
(2009) (“The most recent national survey, released in 2002 by the United States General 
Accounting Office, reported that in 2001, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia 
used contracts with private entities to provide some welfare services.).  
66




 Press Release, “IBM Seeks Enforcement of Indiana Welfare Contract” (May 13, 2010), 
available at: http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/31641.wss (last visited 




 Bowman v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 1:11-CV-00593-RLY, 2012 WL 566258, at *2 
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 21, 2012) (internal citations omitted). 
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to handle these tasks.  Although the state “retained final authority to 
approve or disapprove eligibility[,] it was dependent upon the fact-
gathering, computer entries, and recommendations of the IBM Coalition 
staff when making correct determinations on whether to start, stop, or 
change Medicaid coverage for an individual.”
71
 IBM and its subcontractors 
had considerable discretion over issues such as whether to require 
additional documentation (medical records, interviews, etc.) to demonstrate 
eligibility.   
IBM implemented the modernized system in over fifty Indiana 
counties, but it was not a success.
72
  Significant problems were reported, 
from lost applications to delays in approving benefits, failure to process 
appeals, and errors in decision-making regarding eligibility.
73
  Individual 
beneficiaries claim that these problems led to a host of serious 
consequences. As mentioned above, one mother has sued claiming that her 
schizophrenic son was forced to go off of his medication when he was 
denied benefits and gouged her eyes out.
74
  Other plaintiffs have alleged 
that inability to obtain benefits resulted in consequences from serious 
medical ailments to lost educational opportunities.
75
  
Ultimately, in 2009, Indiana cancelled the contract and instead 
contracted directly with IBM’s subcontractors.
76
  Indiana kept some of 
IBM’s design and its hardware, but implemented a “hybrid” system that 
returned caseworkers to the process.  Both parties sued.  Indiana sought the 
return of $437 million in fees it had paid to IBM, and treble damages—
amounting to more than $1.3 billion.
77
  IBM claimed the state still owed 
$100 million under the contract.   
The legal dispute centered on whether IBM had breached the 
contract by failing to satisfy certain performance metrics.  The parties also 
disputed whether Indiana cancelled the contract “for cause” or “for 
convenience,” a distinction that affects damages.
78
   
Medicaid applicants also sued IBM under a variety of theories.  
Notably, they tried to establish standing to sue for breach of contract as 
third-party beneficiaries.  But in general, members of the public cannot sue 
to enforce public-private contracts such as this one.
79
  It is particularly true 








 Land, supra note 19 
75




 Id., see also “Indiana, IBM sue each other over welfare contract,” INDIANA BUSINESS 
JOURNAL, available at: http://www.ibj.com/indiana-ibm-sue-each-other-over-welfare-
contract/PARAMS/article/19928 
78
 See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment for IBM, Indiana v. Int’l Bus. 
Mach. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451 (Ind. Super. Ct. July 18, 2012) [“Final Order”].   
79
 See Part IV(A)(3), infra. 
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that members of the public cannot sue where the contract contains an 
explicit “no-third party beneficiaries” clause, as the Indiana-IBM contract 
does, and as is common in such agreements.  On that basis, the Indiana 
court dismissed the putative class’s claim for breach of contract.
80
     
The Marion County, Indiana court also recently issued its decision 
in the main case.
81
  It denied Indiana’s claims and granted IBM $52 million 
in damages to cover the cost of equipment Indiana kept and subcontractor 
assignment fees.  The court stated:  
Neither party deserves to win this case.  This story represents 
a ‘perfect storm’ of misguided government policy and 
overzealous corporate ambition. Overall, both parties are to 
blame and Indiana’s taxpayers are left as apparent losers.
82 
 
Indiana vows to appeal, but regardless of the ultimate outcome, the 
Indiana-IBM result is undesirable.  The parties both spent resources 
implementing a system that they ultimately abandoned (at least in part).  
And allegedly, Medicaid beneficiaries received poor service that resulted in 
serious ramifications for their health and well-being.  Both parties have also 
spent untold resources on litigation.  
C. Other Examples 
Certainly not every public-private contract for the provision of soft 
government services results in poor service provision to the public.  No 
empirical study has attempted to measure the success of these public-private 
agreements in any systematic way over any significant sample size.
83
  That 
being said, the New Jersey and Indiana experiences are far from isolated.  
Texas had an agreement with Accenture LLP and Maximus, Inc., 
similar to the IBM-Indiana contract.  The agreement encountered similar 
difficulties and was cancelled as a part of a December 2008 settlement of 
claims.
84
  New York City's first large-scale privatization effort also failed.  
Following PRWORA, the City of New York contracted with private 
vendors to provide welfare-to-work services.
85
  A research study conducted 
by Community Voices Heard states: “Our findings point to a failure of this 
work-first model in achieving its main goal – moving people from welfare 
                                                 
80
 See Bowman, supra note 70. 
81




 Indeed, it is often lamented that there are myriad case studies on privatization failures 
and privatization successes, but little to no systematic empirical data on the privatization 
experience more broadly.  See, e.g., GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 47.   
84
 12/21/2008 Settlement Agreement, available at: 
http://alt.coxnewsweb.com/statesman/pdf/12/121208_accenture.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 
2012).   
85
 See Bach, supra note 65 at 286. 
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to work, into jobs and toward economic independence.”
86
  Instead of 
focusing on long-term employment success through education and training, 
the private entities worked with the easiest candidates to place, ignoring the 




In another example, Nebraska contracted with KVC Behavioral 
Health Services, a private firm, to manage and coordinate child welfare 
services across the state.
88
  The arrangement was highly criticized and 
encountered problems from the outset.
89
  A performance audit was 
undertaken at the request of the Health and Human Services Committee.
 90
 
The Committee “found that the reform effort lacked specific goals, had no 
clear timetable and failed to consider the true cost of a reform that has cost 
$30 million more than original projections.”
91
  The relationship was 
mutually terminated on February 21, 2012, when KVC sought additional 
funds to complete its contractual duties.
92
  Several bills seeking to bring the 
system back into state control have been introduced in the state 
legislature.
93
 Maryland and Connecticut, among other states and localities, 
have had similar experiences.
94
 
                                                 
86
 Id.; see also Sondra Youdelman with Paul Getsos, Research Findings on NYC’s 
Employment 
Services and Placement System and Its Effectiveness In Moving People from Welfare to 






 Grant Schulte, 4th agency quitting Nebraska's child welfare system, raising questions 
about privatized effort, 
http://www.therepublic.com/view/story/9348128d09cf49cfb1b1838e90edc7d4/NE--Child-
Welfare-Management/, February 21, 2012; JoAnne Young, Child Welfare Reorganizes 
after Loss of KVC, http://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/nebraska/child-welfare-
reorganizes-after-loss-of-kvc/article_23f2bb24-0cde-5c37-979c-b20155533f73.html, 
February 21, 2012. 
89
 Schulte, supra note 88. 
90
 Agency Supported Foster Care Contract Between the Nebraska Department of Health 
and Human Services Division of Children and Family Services and KVC Behavioral 
Healthcare Nebraska, Inc., Part II.A, available at, 
http://dhhs.ne.gov/children_family_services/Contracts/48872O4KVCAgencySupportedFC.
pdf, accessed March 7, 2012. 
91
 Performance Audit Committee Nebraska Legislature, DHHS Privatization of Child 
Welfare and Juvenile Services, Committee Report, Vol. 17, No. 1, November, 2011, 
available at http://nebraska.watchdog.org/files/2011/11/privatization2011.pdf, accessed 




 Martha Stoddard, Lawmakers debate ending child welfare privatization (February 29, 
2012), available at: http://www.omaha.com/article/20120228/NEWS01/702299953.  
94
 See, e.g., Greg Garland, Lockheed Called Failure on Child Support Goals: State 
Announces Collection Contract Will Not Be Extended, BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 1999, at 1B 
(Maryland); Jonathan Rabinovitz, In Connecticut, a Privately Run Welfare Program Sinks 
Into Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at B1 (Connecticut).  There are additional 
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In the prison context, media reports and case studies similar to the 
New Jersey example are pervasive.
95
  Accounts have documented numerous 
incidents of “abuse, neglect, violence, escapes, poor conditions, and other 
alarming events in private facilities.”
96
  Studies are inconclusive or mixed 
on the quality of care differential between public and private prisons, but 
there is at least some indication that “private prisons experience a higher 
proportion of inmate-on-inmate assaults; greater likelihood of inmate 
misconduct, drug abuse, and escapes; lower or unmet standards of care; and 
systemic problems in maintaining secure facilities.”
97
   
Before addressing the question of why these public-private 
agreements for government services (in particular soft government services) 
tend to result in low quality service provision,
98
 it is necessary to lay some 
groundwork.  The next Part turns to contract theory and its traditional 
application to firm-firm commercial agreements.  
                                                                                                                            
examples, as well, in Privatized Welfare, supra note 21; Diller, supra note 7 at 1740 (2002) 
(discussing the privatization of Florida’s public assistance program for needy families); and 
Verkuil, supra note 8 at 436–37 (several examples). 
95
 For examples of private prisons around the country and associated media attention, see 
Grassroots Leadership, CONSIDERING A PRIVATE JAIL, PRISON, OR DETENTION CENTER? A 
RESOURCE PACKET FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS (2nd ed, Austin, TX 
2009), and the online resources of The Private Corrections Working Group, 
http://www.privateci.org/.  See also Fred Grimm, Horrors continue in privatized lockups, 
MIAMI HERALD (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/25/2867737/horrors-continue-in-privatized.html 
(reporting on lawsuit allegations of  staffers using violent “take-down” tactics, 
orchestrating inmate-on-inmate fights and doing little to protect vulnerable kids from 
violent attacks from other inmates in private juvenile prison); Jeff Amy, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (June 12, 2012) (reporting on citations issued by OSHA against private prison for 
knowingly failing to provide adequate staffing, fix malfunctioning cell door locks or 
provide training to protect employees from inmate violence); American Civil Liberties 
Union of Ohio, Prisons for profit: A look at prison privatization. (Cleveland, OH 2011); 
Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 5, at 186 (describing issues with private prison 
contracts); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 461 
(2005) (detailing quality failures at CCA's Youngstown, Ohio, facility). 
96
 Christopher Hartney & Caroline Glesmann, How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal 
Justice in the U.S.,  





 This Article concedes that these examples of problematic service provision more closely 
bear upon the contract between the public and private entity if private provision of these 
services is somehow worse than public provision.  See Part III(A)(3) for a discussion of 
why it is likely, in theory, that private firms are less intrinsically motivated to provide 
quality services than the government and why outsourcing provides an excuse for the 
government to permit reduced quality of services.   
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II. The Economic Approach to Contract Law 
Scholarly criticism of the problems discussed in the prior Part is not 
novel.  Public law scholars have analyzed problems with poor service 
provision and lack of accountability in depth.  But commercial law scholars 
have not approached these problems from a private law—and in particular 
an efficiency theory—perspective.  Doing so yields a new way to frame 
these problems, and a new set of potential solutions. 
There are many theories of contract law.  Efficiency theory and 
autonomy theories are the most prominent.  Efficiency theorists tend to 
study commercial contracts between sophisticated firms.  They apply the 
principles of law and economics and argue that the law should encourage 
rational actors to enter into economically efficient contracts that maximize 
the joint surplus.
99
  Autonomy theorists focus mostly on individual-
individual contracting, arguing that contract obligations are deserving of 
respect based on the rights of the contracting parties regardless of whether 
they tend to produce other benefits.
100
  Efficiency gains are the major reason 
that governments enter into privatization agreements, therefore, it makes the 
most sense to explore these contracts through an efficiency lens.  Put 
another way, public-private contracts are modeled on the firm-firm 
commercial contracting platform.  The idea is that public-private contracts 
will function like traditional commercial agreements and indeed the law 
treats these agreements essentially the same as traditional commercial 
agreements.
101
  Therefore, this Article applies efficiency theory principles to 
better understand why public-private contracts tend to result in poor service 
provision.  But before that, this Part briefly covers how efficiency theory 
approaches firm-firm commercial agreements.   
A. Efficiency Theory 
The economic analysis of law proposes that the purpose of the law 
should be to promote economic efficiency.
102
  Building upon the work of 
Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi, Richard Posner first laid the 
groundwork for efficiency theory in the 1970s.  He argued for the 
“allocation of resources in which value is maximized[.]”
103
  It followed that 
the goal of contract doctrine should be “to minimize [contractual] 
                                                 
99
 Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 25 at 619.   
100
 See supra note 25. 
101
 In addition, because non-economic theories of contract mostly focus on individual-
individual contracting, they seem to have more limited application to public-private 
contracting.   
102
 For a more thorough discussion of efficiency-based analysis, see Richard A. Posner, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (6th ed. 2003) (defining and differentiating between two 
models of efficiency, one based on a concept of Pareto-superiority and the other on the 
Kaldor-Hicks construction of efficiency as wealth maximization.).  
103
 Id. 
Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private Contracting 17 
 
 
transaction costs, broadly understood as obstacles to efforts voluntarily to 
shift resources to their most valuable use.”
104
 
Put simply, parties trade efficiently when, and only when, the value 
of the exchanged performance to the buyer exceeds the cost of performance 
to the seller.  These types of deals are “efficient.”  The focus of efficiency 
theory is on ex ante efficient contracting;
105
 i.e. which rules will encourage 
parties to enter into deals that are efficient and wealth maximizing? 
Efficiency theory is predicated on a number of assumptions rooted 
in firm-firm commercial contracts.
106
  In a world of low transaction costs 
and a competitive market, efficiency theory assumes that rational market 
participants will bargain efficiently to maximize the joint surplus.
107
  
Efficiency theory further assumes that contracts do not impose negative 
externalities.
108
  The following subparts discuss these assumptions, which 
pervade efficiency theory analysis, but tend not to be present in public-
private contracting. 
1. Rational Actors Incentivized by Maximizing Profit 
Obtain Gains from Trade and Efficiently Split 
Surplus 
A central tenet of efficiency theory is that parties will make rational, 
wealth-maximizing choices. Efficiency theory assumes that parties value 
assets more or less correctly and that their transacting choices are motivated 
solely by wealth maximization goals.
109
  Relatedly, efficiency theory 
assumes that parties can make rational, wealth-maximizing choices because 
they have good information and “can take clues from the market.”
110
  
The existence of a competitive market is said to reinforce rationality.  
Where rational actors have choices and contracting parties do a poor job, 
they will lose renewal opportunities and future work from other contracting 
partners.
111
  Similarly, individual manager failures will come to the 
                                                 
104
 Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1581, 1583 (2005).  See also Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 
25 at 544 (“contract law should facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to maximize the 
joint gains (the ‘contractual surplus’)”). 
105
 See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54 (Jody S. 
Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).   
106
 In limiting their analysis to firm-firm commercial transactions, Schwartz and Scott 
argue that most of contract law concerns firm-firm commercial agreements.  Contract 




 Id. at 546 (“An analysis of contract law . . . can assume the absence of externalities”). 
109
 It is this assumption that behavioral economists test. 
110
 Robin Paul Malloy, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 32 (1990). 
111
 This assumption also relies on switching costs being low.  Particularly where a deal 
requires a large up front investment in resources, this assumption may be suspect. 
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attention of owners through well-functioning feedback mechanisms.  For 
this reason, efficiency theory assumes that managers rationally pursue 
profit-maximizing strategies.
112
  Indeed, contracting agents are often 
financially incentivized by the overall profit goal of the company, for 
instance, by having their bonuses tied to firm profitability.    
There are, however, limits to the rationality assumption that are now 
well accepted. Studies have shown that parties, due to both intrinsic limits 
of cognition and limited availability of information, do not know, nor can 
know, all the feasible alternative actions open to them.  And they may have 
reasons for making decisions apart from pure profit maximization.  For 
instance, goals can bias beliefs.  People overvalue things they own. And the 
way a choice is framed can alter decisions.
113
  Therefore, actors are said to 
have bounded rationality.
114
   
Nonetheless, where firm-firm commercial interactions are 
concerned, the rationality assumption continues to predominate.  As Alan 
Schwartz and Robert Scott have stated, “it is a plausible working 




2. Role of a Well-Functioning Market 
Efficiency theory also assumes that parties transact in a competitive 
market.  A competitive market has enough buyers and sellers such that each 
party has many alternative trading partners.  It permits parties to make 
rational decisions to maximize their wealth because efficient markets are 
self-correcting and will counteract faulty decision-making.  A competitive 
market also allocates resources efficiently and allows parties to reach 
efficient price terms.
116
   
Market participants have greater incentives to maximize profit when 
they are subject to competitive pressures.  Competition allows contracting 
                                                 
112
 Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 25 at 551. 
113
 The behavioral law and economics movement has identified a much longer list of ways 
in which people act contrary to the rational actor thesis.  These are just a few examples.  
For a more thorough discussion, see Sunstein, supra note 25 and Korobkin & Ulen, supra 
note 25.  
114
 On the subject of bounded rationality, see Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and 
the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385, 385-86 (1989); Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 
(1995); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND 
ORGANIZATION 161 (2d ed. 1986).  It bears noting that studies have shown that “firms 
as institutions may depart from rationality, although at times in different ways and degrees 
than individuals do.”  Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 
IND. L.J. 1527, 1540 (2011).   
115
 Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 25 at 551. 
116
 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS 295 (Addison-Wesley 2007). 
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parties to credibly threaten to take their business elsewhere.
117
 Competition 
also creates pressure to generate information to permit comparisons of 
options.
118
  Competition is said to create incentives for innovation and 




Where there is market failure, economists argue that regulation may 
be (although will not necessarily be) merited.  The most obvious example of 
market failure requiring regulation is monopoly, regulated by the laws of 
antitrust. 
3. Absence of Negative Externalities 
The third related assumption of efficiency theory is the absence of 
negative externalities.
120
  An externality is an effect that a transaction 
between one set of parties puts on other parties who were not a part of the 
deal (and presumably had no say in the matter).  Externalities may be 
negative or positive.  A positive externality is a benefit to non-parties, 
whereas a negative externality imposes costs on non-parties.  If a 
transaction has a negative externality, then the true cost of the transaction is 
higher than that paid by the parties.  The classic example of a negative 
externality is pollution generated by a productive enterprise that negatively 
affects the public, but the cost of which was not internalized by the 
transaction.   
Efficiency theory is typically applied “to contracts between firms 
that do not create externalities.”
121
  In the absence of externalities, and 
where there is a competitive market, economic theory states that efficient 
transacting occurs.  On the other hand, when a negative externality exists in 
an unregulated market, contracting parties do not take responsibility for the 
costs their deal passes on to society.
122
  Thus, contract law cannot trust that 
a deal represents an efficient outcome because the price of the contract does 
not represent the true cost of the transaction.   
4. Efficiency Theory and Default Rules 
Efficiency theory cannot explain all of contract doctrine.
123
  But the 
normative version of efficiency theory has been used extensively to argue 
                                                 
117




 Id. (“Whether these benefits of competition work well outside purely private markets 
remains a subject of much academic and political debate.”). 
120
 See HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 30 (Polinsky and Shavell eds. 2007) (“[T]he 
efficiency of markets and private contracting is contingent on there being no third-party 
externalities.”). 
121
 Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 25 at 549. 
122
 In general, to the extent parties do cause negative externalities, the laws of antitrust, 
employment, environmental, and even tort law control, but not contract law.   
123
 See William Lucy, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 38 (Oxford University Press 2007). 
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what contract doctrine should be, particularly as to firm-firm commercial 
agreements.  For example, efficiency theory has been invoked to argue that 
contract law should prefer default rules over mandatory rules.   
A perfect contract would provide for every contingency, but in the 
real world, contracts are incomplete.  A default rule is one that fills a gap in 
a contract where the parties have not selected a different rule.  Default rules 
can be contracted around if the parties make an explicit choice to do so.  An 
example is awarding expectation damages—parties can specify a different 
measure of damages if they choose.
124
  On the other hand, a mandatory or 
immutable rule is one that the parties cannot contract around.  The most 
common example is the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Efficiency theory, in general, supports the use of default rules, not 
mandatory rules.  Indeed, law and economics scholars have long fought 
against the use of immutable rules, including those based on public 
policy.
125
  They argue that particularly where parties are rational actors 
functioning in a competitive market, the law should trust the parties to enter 
into a deal that maximizes the joint surplus.  If the parties are prevented 
from certain outcomes due to the existence of mandatory rules, the result 
generally will be less efficient.  Judge Frank Easterbrook has said that the 
imposition of mandatory rules “almost invariably ensure[s] that there will 
be fewer gains and more losses tomorrow” because “[a] right that cannot be 
the subject of bargaining is worth less, just as eagle feathers that cannot be 
sold are worth less to their owners.”
126
  And in their famous article on 
filling gaps in incomplete contracts, Robert Gertner and Ian Ayres argued 
that “[i]mmutability is justified only if unregulated contracting would be 
socially deleterious because parties internal or external to the contract 
cannot adequately protect themselves.”
127
 
                                                 
124
 Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, Vol. A-D 585 (Peter Newman, ed., 1998). 
125
 G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 500 
(1993), see also Stewart Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 237, 239 (1988).  Even if it can be shown theoretically that an immutable 
rule might be efficient, economists have concluded that “there is small hope that lawmakers 
will be able to divine the efficient rule in practice.” Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic 
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 733 
(1992).  
126
 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and The Economic System, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 11 (1984).  Even default rules can affect party preferences.  See Russell Korobkin, 
The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). 
127
 Robert Gertner & Ian Ayres, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989).  Note that not all economists decry all 
mandatory rules.  Steven Burton famously defended the mandatory duty of good faith and 
fair dealing on economic grounds, arguing that the rule serves as a way to remedy 
asymmetries in information and opportunistic behavior, both of which add transaction costs 
and muddy the perfect contracting environment.  See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract 
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980).  
Judge Posner echoed Professor Burton’s argument in Market Street Assocs. Ltd. 
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B. Agency Theory 
Agency theory is a particular application of efficiency theory.
 128
   It 
focuses on the issues that arise when an agent carries out work on behalf of 
a principal, and the interests of the two parties do not coincide.
129
  
Efficiency theory predicts that in a well-functioning market, where there is 
perfect information and the ability to monitor, there should be little 
difficulty aligning incentives between principals and agents.  If the principal 
is able to sufficiently monitor the agent’s performance, it can design 
sanctions and incentives to encourage optimal behavior.  Further, if the 
agent knows that the principal will become aware of poor performance, and 
there are switching options in the marketplace, the agent will be dissuaded 
from performing poorly.
130
  The agent will also be concerned about 
reputational effects of poor quality service provision.   
Agency problems are often said to arise between the shareholders of 
a firm (the principals) and its managers (the agents).  But efficiency theory 
ultimately dismisses these costs as being avoidable because both parties 
have an interest in the firm maximizing its profit.
131
   
However, in many principal-agent relationships, there is information 
asymmetry in that the agent knows more about its actions than the principal 
does.  The principal either cannot fully monitor the agent or it is too costly 
to adequately monitor the agent.
132
  Moral hazard occurs when the agent 
acts in ways that the principal would not want it to act, if it knew fully what 
the agent was doing.
133
 
Agency theory focuses on correcting for this type of opportunistic 
behavior.  As it pertains to contracting, specifically, it focuses on the ways 
in which principals can try to align incentives through contract.  For 
                                                                                                                            
Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991): “The parties want to minimize the 
costs of performance. To the extent that a doctrine of good faith designed to do this by 
reducing defensive expenditures is a reasonable measure to this end, interpolating it into 
the contract advances the parties’ joint goal.” 
128
 The term “agency theory” is used here in the economic sense and is distinct from 
principles of common law agency, where the same term may be found. 
129
 Kieron Walsh, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS: COMPETITION, 
CONTRACTING AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 37 (St. Martin’s Press 1995). 
130
 See generally Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. 
ECON. 288, 295-97 (1980) (discussing the extent to which market forces can discipline 
managers). 
131
 In actuality, agents’ incentives are far more complicated.  For instance, they may have 
an incentive to take actions that will be externally visible and enhance their attractiveness 
to future employers.  Or they may have an incentive to exert little effort on tasks that will 
never be visible to shareholders. 
132
 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976); Steven 
Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. 
ECON. 55, 66 (1979). 
133
 Id. 
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example, principals can pay for good outcomes or issue sanctions for bad 
ones, require compliance with certain specific performance measures, 
and/or invoke reporting procedures.
134
   
Although agency issues come up in many contexts, private business 
outsourcing is an obvious example.  Recent studies describe how parties 
engaged in business outsourcing confront issues of incentive alignment and 
control in practice.
135
  For instance, one study reports finding a spectrum in 
contractual governance mechanisms that parties use to mitigate agency 
costs.  At one end of the spectrum are “market-like” contracts that adopt 
fixed fees, weak or no incentive or penalty clauses, and pay little attention 
to service levels or monitoring rights—essentially low control contracts.  At 
the other end of the spectrum are “firm-like” contracts that utilize extensive 
financial incentives and control rights, with considerable monitoring and 
economic consequences linked to performance.
136
  In the study sample, 
firms pursuing simpler outsourcing functions (i.e. IT or call center work) 
tended to choose contracts at the market-like (less control) end of the 
spectrum.  On the other hand, entities outsourcing more complex business 
functions with higher risk for agency costs used more firm-like (higher 
control) contractual governance mechanisms.
137
  It is unsurprising that 
commercial parties facing potentially high agency costs are utilizing many 
of the control mechanisms suggested by traditional agency theory. 
III. Problems in Public-Private Contracts  
Efficiency theory postulates that contracts will be efficient where the 
assumptions discussed in the prior Part are satisfied.  But efficiency 
theorists recognize that the traditional assumptions do not always apply.
 138
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 Walsh, supra note 129 at 37. 
135
 See George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions, 
96 VA. L. REV. 241, 271-72 (2010); Margaret M. Blair, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Gregg 
Kirchhoefer, Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
263 (2011). 
136
 Geis, supra note 135.  It is somewhat disingenuous to discuss these studies under the 
heading “Agency Theory,” because this work investigates the implications of transaction 
cost economics (TCE).  TCE shares certain similarities with agency theory in that it, too, is 
concerned with conflicts arising from a divergence of goals between contracting parties.  
TCE is generally invoked in the context of a firm’s “make or buy” decision and considers 
the transaction costs involved in contracting out for a product or service rather than 
handling it “in house.”  Although there are important differences between agency theory 
and TCE, the distinctions are of little import to this Article, where the focus is on the 
problems that may ensue between principals and agents in a poor market where incentives 




 As Victor Goldberg noted many years ago, but which is still true to a lesser extent 
today, “[t]he paradigmatic contract of economic theory (and of law) is a discrete 
transaction conveying a well-defined object (the ever popular widget) in exchange for 
cash.”  See Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 THE BELL 
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For example, transacting parties sometimes cause negative externalities that 
the law would want to deter.  Or market failures challenge the assumption 
that the parties have efficaciously negotiated towards the most efficient 
outcome.  As Schwartz and Scott state, “[t]hese objections should trouble a 
unitary efficiency approach to the regulation of all contract types[.]”
139
  
Indeed, these objections take center stage in public-private contracting.  
In certain types of public-private contracting, uncontrolled agency 
costs, misaligned incentives, costs akin to negative externalities, market 
failures, and difficulty in specifying tasks lead to contracts that prioritize 
cost savings over quality service provision.  The effect is that the contract 
imposes costs on service recipients that the contract price does not 
reflect.
140
 Broadly speaking, there are two issues.  First, particularly as to 
contracts for soft government services, the government has strong 
incentives to cut costs through outsourcing, but limited incentives to 
guarantee good service.  Second, even if the government were incentivized 
to provide good service, it is difficult to align those incentives with those of 
the private service provider.   
A. The Government Has Strong Incentives to Cut Costs, But 
Limited Incentives to Guarantee Good Service 
Private service providers are motivated to maximize profit.
141
  
Usually when scholars debate the efficacy of privatization, they focus on 
whether private sector firms pursue their profit maximization goal by 
reducing service quality or by innovating to cut costs (in which case, service 
levels may continue to be high).
142
  The answer to that question, at bottom, 
is an empirical one to which there is no good answer.
143
  This subpart 
focuses on a related but somewhat different question.  Is the government 
motivated to ensure high quality service provision?  If the government is 
not acting in ways that promote quality service provision (for instance 
                                                                                                                            
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 426, 426 (1976). 
139
 Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 25 at 609. 
140
 Essentially, contracts are underpriced.  At least that is the case putting aside potential 
bargaining problems.  Indeed, it is possible that even with the failure to internalize the cost 
of poor service provision, that the contract is still overpriced if the government is a poor 
negotiator. 
141
 Staunch supporters of privatization always point to the possibility that the private actor 
will innovate and more efficiently provide comparable or even higher quality services, but 
at bottom, few would dispute the primacy of profit maximization and cost-cutting goals for 
the private actor. 
142
 Economic models on this issue are inconclusive.  See, e.g., III. A Tale of Two Systems, 
supra note 2 at 1877-78 (2002) (detailing how early economic models predicted 
privatization would reduce both cost and quality, but recent literature argues that private 
contractors may be motivated to innovate in a way that cuts cost but not service quality.). 
143
 Id., see also supra note 83.  
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monitoring or switching providers when performance is poor), it follows 
that quality service provision is significantly less likely to occur. 
This subpart argues that the government lacks motivation to ensure 
that private providers deliver high quality service when certain services are 
outsourced because (1) its primary focus is on cost savings, and (2) market 
forces and political forces that would normally align incentives between the 
outsourcing company and the service recipient are lacking.
 144
 
1. Primacy of Cost-Cutting Goal 
Privatization theory is primarily predicated on cost savings.  It 
argues that by subjecting government services to market forces and 
competition, costs will be driven down.
145
  Scholars debate privatization’s 
effect on service quality, but in the United States, most of the dialogue 
about privatization centers on the potential for cost-savings.
146
   
There is ample evidence that governments outsource in order to cut 
costs.  For instance, in a survey conducted in 2007, 87% of local 
government respondents stated that their primary reason for choosing 
privatization was an “attempt[] to decrease cost.”
147
  Fifty percent of 
respondents said they were also motivated by “external fiscal pressures, 
including restrictions placed on raising taxes.”
148
  The Reason Foundation 
also confirms that state agencies have ramped up their use of privatization 
as a means of cutting costs and balancing tighter budgets.
149
 
The strong link between privatization and cost-cutting is 
unsurprising, particularly because state laws and local ordinances often 
                                                 
144
 As Martha Minow correctly notes, “with social services . . . accountability becomes 
especially important but also recalcitrant, because those most directly affected by the 
services or failures to provide services are politically and economically ineffectual. 
Treatment of vulnerable populations simply does not work well in markets that depend 
upon consumer rationality or upon political processes that demand active citizen 
monitoring.”  Minow, supra note 21 at 1262. 
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 See Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Proper Scope of 
Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1143 (1997) 
(“Costs . . . are always lower under private ownership. Quality . . . may be higher or lower 
under private ownership.”). 
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 See Adrian Moore, Making Privatization Work for State Government (The Reason 
Foundation, August 1, 2002), available at http://reason.org/news/printer/making-
privatization-work-for (“Here in the United States we have traditionally privatized services 
for the money. . . .”); see also Dolovich, supra note 95 at 471-72 (“As for the state, in the 
American context, the central aim is to save money on the cost of corrections.”); Joseph I. 
Hallinan, GOING UP THE RIVER: TRAVELS IN A PRISON NATION 164 (2001) (“The success of 
private prisons. . . is driven by a single premise: They are cheaper than their public 
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 Leonard Gilroy and Harris Kenny, Annual Privatization Report 2011 (The Reason 
Foundation, May 1, 2012), available at: http://reason.org/news/show/annual-privatization-
report-2011. 
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require proof of cost savings prior to permitting privatization.
150
 For 
instance, an Ohio statute requires that contractors “convincingly 
demonstrate” that they can provide at least a five percent savings over the 
cost of public service provision.
151
  Florida similarly requires that “[t]he 
Department of Management Services may not enter into a contract or series 
of contracts unless the department determines that the contract or series of 
contracts . . . will result in a cost savings of at least 7 percent over the public 
provision of a similar facility.”
152
 
The same is often true at the local level.  In California, one county’s 
charter requires that the contracting agent determine that services be 
provided “more economically and efficiently” by a private contractor than 
by the government before it is permitted to enter into a contract.
153
  Further, 




The rhetoric of government officials only confirms government’s 
focus on the bottom line in making privatization decisions.  In a news 
conference last year, the elected official responsible for privatizing prisons 
in Essex County, New Jersey, addressed his decision to free up beds in 
county prisons to “rent” those beds to the federal government: “My chief 
responsibility is to bring in revenue for this county, and we’ve done it very, 
very well.”
155
  He also noted his motivation to “keep the taxes low.”
156
 
While some states do require consideration of both cost savings and 
quality in the privatization decision, the number of such states is small.
157
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 Presumably these requirements are grounded in efforts to dissuade corruption and 
cronyism.   
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 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §9.06(A)(4) (West 2001 Supp.). 
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 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 957.07(1) (West Supp. 2004); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-24-
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 See Giles v. Horn, 100 Cal. App. 4th 206, 214 (2002) (citing County Charter, article IX, 
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 See 81A C.J.S. States § 286 (citing Lewis & Michael, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv., 
103 Ohio Misc. 2d 29 (Ct. Cl. 1999) (Ohio); Balsbaugh v. Com. Dept. of General Services, 
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quality of service.  See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 21; Goldberg, supra note 138 at (noting 
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 See Dolnick, supra note 46. 
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 Id., see also Lisa Belkin, Rise of Private Prisons: How Much of a Bargain?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1989, at A14 (“I'm an old state bureaucrat. . . . I don't have any 
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Bob Owens, internal auditor for the Texas Department of Corrections)); Nzong Xiong, 
Private Prisons: A Question of Savings, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1997 at C5 (“I think as long 
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Corrections)). 
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 See III. A Tale of Two Systems, supra note 2 at 1873-74 (2002) (citing five states whose 
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Even where quality improvements are supposed to enter into the calculus, 
they end up subservient to cost reduction because quality improvements are 
difficult to contract for ex ante and difficult to monitor ex post.
158
  
Relatively speaking, it is much easier to ascertain whether privatizing has 
succeeded in cutting costs than whether it has succeeded in improving 
quality. 
2. The Government Has Little Incentive to Effect Good 
Service Where Service Recipients Have Limited 
Economic and Political Power 
There are other reasons that government actors lack adequate 
incentive to care about quality.  While some government actors may be 
altruistic, or have public policy beliefs that cause them to promote high 
quality services,
159
 rational, self-interested government actors have little 
incentive—either economic or political—to promote high quality service, 
particularly where the service benefits a small, disenfranchised segment of 
the population.
160
   
a) The Economics 
In the private sector, where there is a competitive market, customers 
can affect the quality of product and service offerings.  “[A] hypothetical 
consumer chooses one product over another, drawing resources to the better 
product and leading to the improved outcomes and efficiencies that the 
market model promises.”
161
  Public-private contracting for soft government 
services does not work in the same way.   
An analogy to private outsourcing will help frame the issue.   
Consider a hypothetical example where Macy’s, the department store chain, 
outsources its website support operations to an Indian company, Tata 
Consultancy Services (TCS).  Macys’ owners may have difficulty 
controlling its managers and Macy’s may have trouble controlling TCS.  
                                                                                                                            
statutes require consideration of quality in addition to cost); see also Charles L. Ryan, 
BIENNIAL COMPARISON OF “PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC PROVISION OF 





 The Government may also lack incentives to care about quality when it provides these 
services directly.  See Part III(A)(3).  See also Part III(B)(2), infra, for a discussion of 
difficulties in specification and monitoring. 
159
 Part IV(B) will further discuss appealing to social norms to yield better results. 
160
 These problems inhere in direct government service provision, as well, but see Part 
III(A)(3) for a discussion of why outsourcing makes these problems worse and has the 
capacity to make them better. 
161
 See Bach, supra note 65 at 300. 
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These agency costs are mitigated by market forces that align profit 
maximization goals and contract control mechanisms, such as specifying 
tasks and monitoring.
162
   
Macy’s and its customers will undoubtedly have divergent interests, 
as well, but Macy’s is motivated in some real sense to keep its customers 
happy.  If its customers aren’t happy, they will choose to shop at a different 
department store.  Without customers buying its products, Macy’s cannot be 
a profitable business.  As long as Macy’s can convince TCS to keep its 
customers happy, agency costs are not debilitating. 
Now let’s carry the analogy through to public-private contracting 
using the IBM-Indiana outsourcing example.  There, Indiana is the 
purchaser (like Macy’s).  Indiana’s citizens are akin to Macys’ shareholders.  
IBM, the service provider, is equivalent to TCS.  And Indiana welfare 
beneficiaries are essentially the customers.
163
  The same two agency costs 
that occur in private outsourcing might also occur in the public-private 
example.  Indiana’s citizens might have trouble controlling their 
government, and Indiana might have trouble controlling IBM.  But in 
public-private contracting, there is an additional difficulty.  Unlike the 
interests of Macy’s and its customers, the interests of welfare beneficiaries 
and Indiana citizens more generally tend to be diametrically opposed.  This 
is particularly true for soft government services, which affect only a small 
portion of society.
164
  The public, for the most part, will want the 
government to prioritize saving money (and reducing taxes) over providing 
high quality prisons or welfare administration.
165
  Simultaneously, the 
beneficiaries desire high-quality service and care little about the cost.  Even 
if the public is altruistic, or understands the negative implications for larger 
society by these services failing, they may never know if private parties are 
                                                 
162
 See Part III(B). 
163
 The beneficiaries are also citizens of Indiana, so to complicate matters, they are part of 
both the “shareholders” group and the “customers” group. 
164
 Note that the soft vs. hard distinction is particularly important in the “serving two 
masters” context.  With hard services that affect the entire public, the entire public has an 
interest in quality service provision.  If the government contracts for a hard service and 
quality is poor, it is likely that the larger public will become aware of the issue, and that the 
collective public will be able to use its political power to force the government to affect 
change. 
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 Of course this is not always true and arguably should not be true.  When prisons are 
poorly run and people escape, that affects the general public.  And when people do not 
obtain access to Medicaid benefits, they cannot pay for health care, and that ultimately 
imposes larger costs on the system.  Consider the larger debate about the Affordable Care 
Act on this point.  However, as a matter of relative preferences, most non-service 
beneficiaries will care more about their taxes being as low as possible, and less about the 
quality of service offered to welfare applicants.  Even further, the general public may not 
know when prisons have poor security or the welfare system functions poorly.  
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running low quality prisons or poorly administering welfare benefits.
166
  
They will, however, know if their taxes go up.   
The “customers” in public-private contracting lack the economic 
power that they have in the private analog.  For one, the government is not 
motivated by gaining market share.  And “customers” (welfare 
beneficiaries) have no market for services.
167
  If they don’t like how IBM is 
administering the system, there is no other choice.  As such, the service 
recipients have almost no economic power to force the government to care 
about their interests.
168
  The next question, then, is whether they can instead 
invoke their political power. 
b) The Political Story 
Politically, governments are accountable, at least in theory, to the 
publics at whose behest they serve.  But the public-private contracting 
scenario begs the question of which “public” the government serves.  
Essentially, the government must serve two masters whose interests are at 
odds.
169
     
Because the larger public wields more political power than the 
service beneficiaries, the government will feel added pressure to prioritize 
cost savings over quality service provision.  Indeed, groups like criminals 
and poor people decidedly lack political power. Felons cannot vote and are 
generally powerless to effect change.
170
  And for a variety of reasons, low-
income people are less likely to vote than their wealthier counterparts, and 
even less likely to mobilize politically as a group.
171
  This problem is 
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 The press coverage of the IBM-Indiana and CEC-New Jersey contract failures are the 
exception, not the rule.   
167
 See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to 
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra 
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because there is no nongovernment market for the product in question.”). 
168
 This is also a problem with direct service provision.  See Part III(A)(3). 
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which public?  Public officials, for example, are accountable to the general public, although 
difficult and subtle questions can arise as to the relevant “public” to which officials must 
respond.”). 
170
 Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in 
Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 824-826 (1990) (inmates powerless to effect change); 
Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government, in THE TOOLS OF 
GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 282, 287-88 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 
2002); VI. One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939 (2002) (felons lose the right to vote for life). 
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 Thom File and Sarah Crissey, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 
2008 (July 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20-562.pdf 
(reporting than in the 2008 election, low-income people, minorities and renters were less 
likely to register and to vote than their wealthier, white, home-owning counterparts). 
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unique to soft government services.  If a private service provider failed to 
pick up a city’s garbage, everyone would notice and everyone would care.  
Not so with soft government services. 
There are other reasons, as well, that government actors tend to lack 
the (political) incentive to ensure quality service provision.  For instance, 
government actors are unlikely to be in office when poor service starts to 
matter politically.
172
  One of Governor Christie’s first responses to the poor 
halfway house publicity in New Jersey was to blame the prior 
administration.
173
  And some individual government actors will make 
decisions motivated by opportunities after public employment, to boost 




This Article does not discount that government actors are boundedly 
rational and therefore will at times be motivated by notions of altruism or 
other social norms.  Indeed, the more government actors who are motivated 
in altruistic ways, perhaps the more likely projects are to succeed.  But 
nonetheless, there is a systematic bias based on the economic and political 
incentives of government actors to favor contracts that cut costs and 
sacrifice quality. 
3. Why This Is A Contracting Problem 
So far, many of the reasons provided for the government’s lack of 
incentive to provide high quality “soft” services would apply equally to 
direct government service provision as they do to government outsourcing.  
When a government directly runs a prison or administers welfare benefits, it 
too will have limited incentive outside the altruistic, public service ones, to 
provide quality service.  Outsourcing to private providers is supposed to 
ameliorate those problems.  And yet, the government’s lack of incentive to 
ensure high quality service pervades the public-private contracting 
relationship, as well.  
But the foregoing analysis begs an additional question: why does the 
contracting relationship matter?  Does outsourcing lead to worse service 
provision than government-service provision? 
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 Statement from Governor Chris Christie on Halfway House Oversight and 
Accountability (June 18, 2012), available at: 
http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/552012/approved/20120618a.html. 
174
 Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan, Richardson v. McKnight and the Scope of 
Immunity after Privatization, 8 S. CT. ECON. REV. 103, 111, 124 (2000). 
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The empirical evidence on this is both preliminary and mixed.
175
  
Mixed results are unsurprising, in part because quality is difficult to assess 
and comparisons between public and private enterprises (consider prisons 
more specifically) are difficult to fairly make. 
Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that contracting out does 
decrease the incentive to provide good service even beyond what has 
already been addressed.  For one, there are occasions when poor service 
provision does come to the attention of the general public and poor service 
provision affects the broader public.  In the New Jersey halfway house 
example, it was reported that inmates were escaping and committing violent 
crimes.  When something like that happens, the government gains some 
political insulation from the fact that the private service provider erred and 
not the government directly.  As Jody Freeman argues, the government can 
point its finger at the private entity and avoid political backlash.
176
   
It is hard to know how often this occurs and with what success, but 
at the very least, there are instances of states attempting to put blame on the 
private contractor rather than accept responsibility.  The Indiana-IBM case 
is a good example.  Although the court’s final order in that litigation 
blamed, in part, Indiana’s role in designing a faulty welfare administration 
system, Indiana’s rhetoric post-decision continues to point the finger at 
IBM:   
We believe the court’s view that IBM's concededly bad 
performance did not materially breach the contract is wrong, 
and cannot be squared with the overwhelming evidence of 
poor performance. . . . IBM’s own senior executive called it 
                                                 
175
 See supra note 83; Nathan Newman, Privatizing in the Dark: The Pitfalls of 
Privatization & Why Budget Disclosure is Needed, with a 50-State Comparison of 
Privatization Trends (December 2007), available at: 
http://www.progressivestates.org/files/privatization/PrivatizationReport.pdf (noting lack of 
reliable quality data, but finding “at least one analysis of privatization of state and local 
services over the last 20 years found the majority of such projects failed because of 
deteriorating quality of service.”).  See also Dolovich, supra note 95 at 504-05 (citing a 
study in Oklahoma finding over a three-year period that “private prisons recorded more 
than twice as many incidents as public ones.  Similar findings were also made in an earlier 
study commissioned by the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC).”); cf., Francois 
Melese, Privatizing Public Hospitals: A Win-Win for Taxpayers and the Poor, The Reason 
Foundation (Nov. 2005); A Tale of Two Systems, supra note 2 at 1875-76 (noting difficulty 
in comparing quality across public and private prisons, but arguing that “none of the more 
rigorous studies finds quality at private prisons lower than quality at public prisons on 
average.”). 
176
 See The Contracting State, supra note 5; see also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in 
Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1121, 1210 (2000) (“When problems arise, government officials and private 
contractors can point fingers at each other, leaving the public with little means of knowing 
who is really at fault.”); David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 
CAL L REV 393, 400 (2008) (same). 
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an ‘abomination,’ and IBM executives repeatedly admitted 
the State had good reasons to be dissatisfied.”
177
 
Second, while the prior subparts discussed why self-interested 
government actors have little incentive to provide good service, it is 
possible that the prevalence of altruistic actors is greater amongst 
government employees than private actors.  While government actors may 
not have the economic or political incentive to provide quality service, 
scholars have argued that they are more inherently likely to provide quality 
service than private actors who are highly motivated by maximizing 
profit.
178
  Also, in the private sector, workers’ bonuses are often tied to the 
overall profitability of the company.  Individual private sector workers who 
are self-interested will therefore be motivated to cut costs and maximize 
profit.  Government employees may have the same motivations (in 
particular by having to stick to tight budgets), but in general, government 
employees are not financially rewarded by cutting costs.  This is one of the 
arguments as to why the private sector may be able to deliver services more 
cheaply.  But it is also a reason that private service providers might be even 
more motivated than government actors to provide low quality service. 
Finally, even if both government service provision and private 
service provision suffer equally from low incentives to provide high quality 
service, nonetheless, contracting out opens the door to contract-based 





The government is motivated to cut costs and lacks adequate 
motivation to care about the quality of service being provided.  There are 
arguably many reasons to care about this result from a fairness and public 
policy perspective.  But so too is the result undesirable from an economic 
perspective because the government is entering into contracts with private 
parties that impose costs on non-party service recipients—costs that the 
contracting parties do not bear. 
Technically, this may not be a negative externality because the 
service recipients are members of the public who are also the principal to 
                                                 
177
 Jon Murray, Indiana Must Pay IBM $12M for Canceled Contract, Judge Rules, THE 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (July 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.governing.com/news/state/mct-indiana-must-pay-ibm-for-canceled-
contract.html; see also Dan McFeely, Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles Passes Blame 
over License Renewals, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Feb. 22, 2003), available at 2003 WLNR 
10904930 (“Under fire for botching the license plate renewals for more than 200,000 
Hoosiers, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is changing its original story and shifting the 
blame from the agency to a private contractor.”). 
178
 See, e.g., The Contracting State, supra note 5. 
179
 Id. 
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the government as agent.  But regardless of the terminology, the effect is the 
same.  If Buyer B and Seller S enter into a contract to produce a widget for 
$100, efficiency theory assumes that $100 is an efficient price that has made 
neither party worse off.  If S and B pollute the environment as a result of 
their transaction, and the pollution negatively affects non-parties to the 
contract, then $100 does not reflect the true cost of the transaction.  Instead, 
the cost of the transaction is really $100 plus the cost of the pollution.  The 
parties’ transaction should account for that cost.  This is the logic behind 
environmental legislation and other forms of regulation that force parties to 
internalize costs.  Because the government and the private service provider 
do not account in their contract for the cost of poor service provision, their 
contract is essentially underpriced.   
But these failures between the government and the beneficiaries are 
not the only ones that trouble public-private contracts.  The next subpart 
discusses the problems between the government and the private service 
provider. 
B. Government Difficulties in Effectuating Good Service 
The second major problem in public-private contracting is that even 
were the government motivated to obtain high quality service from its 
contractor, it is difficult to accomplish that goal using traditional tools to 
control agency costs.  Economic theory predicts that market forces will 
motivate agents to perform well.  Further, agency theory predicts that 
contract specification and monitoring will align party incentives.  But the 
realities in public-private contracting are different.   
1. Lack of Market Competition 
Law and economics theory predicts that competition fosters 
efficiency.  Market competition forces agents not only to control costs, but 
also to deliver quality services.
180
  If a private provider fails to deliver 
quality service, the contracting party will choose another service provider at 
contract renewal.
181
 Because agents want future business, they will provide 
high quality services.
182
  Agents are also concerned about reputational 
effects in the marketplace.  Therefore, they are incentivized to perform well.  
                                                 
180
 See Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 890, 918 (2010) (“More generally, it can be argued that a competitive market operates 
as a powerful constraint that makes direct accountability less critical.”). 
181
 See Jeffrey D. Greene, CITIES AND PRIVATIZATION. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall 2002); John D. Donahue, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc. 1989) (emphasizing the “cardinal importance of competition” in privatization, and 
stating that “most of the kick in privatization comes from the greater scope for rivalry when 
functions are contracted out, not from private provision per se). 
182
 Rubin, supra note 180 (“Firms that compete for government contracts will necessarily 
strive to achieve the goals that the agency sets so that the agency will renew the contracts 
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Whereas private outsourcing agreements generally benefit from the 
agency cost reducing effect of market competition, certain types of public 
outsourcing contracts do not benefit, at least to the desired extent.  
Governments face shallow markets for privatizing certain services.
183
  In the 
Indiana example, IBM and its subcontractors submitted the only bid for its 
welfare outsourcing project.
184
  When Arizona privatized its state welfare 
system, only one company offered a bid.
185
  In New Jersey, there was only 
one bidder for a contract to run a 450-bed immigrant detention center.
186
  
The list of outsourcing contracts entered into after a single bid, or a low 
number of bids, is a long one.
187
  
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that market forces fail to force high 
levels of performance in government outsourcing contracts as efficiency 
theory would predict.
188
  True market conditions require that both buyers 
and sellers have options in contracting partners and that there be relatively 
low barriers to entry in the marketplace.
189
  There is always at least one 
                                                                                                                            
or grant them other contracts in the future.”) 
183
 Elliot Sclar, YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF 
PRIVATIZATION 92 (Cornell University Press 2000) (“In privatization debates, beneficial 
competition is treated as analogous to a common and hardy lawn weed that sprouts 
whenever its seeds touch the earth.  A more accurate analogy would be to a rare orchid, 
whose beauty is undoubtable but only blossoms under very special conditions.”). 
184
 Final Order, supra note 78 at 6-7. 
185
 Stevenson, supra note 21 at 90-92 n.37. 
186
 Sam Dolnick, Reversing Course, Officials in New Jersey Cancel One-Bid Immigrant 




 In Connecticut, Colonial Cooperative Care, Inc. was the only bidder for its contract to 
determine eligibility for disability-based cash assistance.  See generally, Stevenson, supra 
note 21 at 90-92. 
188
 Christopher Hartney and Caroline Glesmann, Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations 
Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S. (May 2012), available at: 
http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf (lack of 
competition “also contributes to the likelihood of inadequate performance once a contract 
is executed.  If a particular industry only has a few providers, the government’s ability to . . 
. it is difficult to effectively replace one provider with another, if the need arises.”). 
189
 Robert S. Pindyck & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, MICROECONOMICS 271-73 (7th ed. 2009) 
(“The inability of any given buyer or seller to affect the price of an item is one of the 
hallmarks of a perfectly competitive market.”); Rubin, supra note 180 at 918 (2010) (“Ideal 
competition occurs when the government is one of many buyers for a product that has 
many sellers.”); Stevenson, supra note 21 at 90–91; Jocelyn M. Johnston & Amanda M. 
Girth, Contract management in thin markets: Examining transaction costs and contract 
effectiveness, available at: 
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/conferences/pmrc/Files/Johnston%20Contract
%20management%20in%20thin%20markets%20Examining%20transaction%20costs%20a
nd%20contract%20effectiveness.pdf (“Three or more bidders seem to be widely accepted 
as indicative of some minimal level of competition.”); David Lowery, Consumer 
Sovereignty and Quasi-Market Failure, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH 
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other seller option in the sense that the government could choose to take a 
service back in house, but that option, even assuming it is a realistic one, 
does not make a market “competitive.”  Much of the proof of shallow 
competition is anecdotal, nonetheless, studies have confirmed that 
competitive markets are lacking.  For instance, a 2007 survey of city and 
municipal governments found that, on average, there are fewer than two 
provider options for city service contracts.
190
  State governments also 




Not all types of outsourcing see low levels of competition.  This is 
another point in the analysis where the distinction between hard and soft 
government services matters.
192
  For one, soft services require higher 
relationship-specific investments because there tends to be no equivalent in 
the private, commercial market.  There are no commercial owners of 
prisons or administrators of public benefits.
193
   
Also, the buyer market (governments) is usually much smaller than 
it is in private outsourcing markets, dampening interest in the seller side 
market to develop expertise.
 194
   For instance, it has become clear that there 
is demand on the private buyer side for outsourced call center services.  
Therefore, companies are incentivized to develop this expertise.  There is 
                                                                                                                            
AND THEORY 137-172 (1998) (arguing that quasi-markets often fail to meet efficiency 
objectives due to in part to market failure). 
190
 See Mildred Warner & Amir Hefetz, Service Characteristics and Contracting: The 
Importance of Citizen Interest and Competition, THE MUN. Y.B. 19-27 (2010). 
191
 For a good summary of studies (survey and interview methods) on competition in local 
and state-level outsourcing, see David M. Van Slyke, The Mythology of Privatization in 
Contracting for Social Services. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 63(3): 296-315 at Table 
1 (2003).  See also Mildred E. Warner & Bel. Germa,. Competition or Monopoly? 
Comparing Privatization of Local Public Services in the US and Spain, PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 86(3): 723-735 (2008); Jocelyn M. Johnston & Barbara S. Romzek, 
Social Welfare Contracts as Networks: The Impact of Networks Stability on Management 
and Performance, ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY 40(2): 115-146 (2008). 
192
 David M. Van Slyke, Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the 
Government-Nonprofit Social service Contracting Relationship, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 17(1): 157-187 (2007) (“There are significant 
differences among contracted services, such as social services and refuse collection, in 
terms of the market and political ideology supporting or opposing alternative service 
delivery arrangements, the level of market competition that exists, and the ease of defining, 
measuring, and observing outputs and outcomes.”); see also Donohue, supra note 2 
(supporting outsourcing of commodity or hard services and not custom or soft services 
because private entities can be as inefficient as the government in a noncompetitive 
market.) 
193
 Rubin, supra note 180 (“There are certain activities of government, however, that have 
no market analogue, either because no one would buy them or because no one would sell 
them. Punishment is an example of the first, and welfare benefits (free money) are an 
example of the second.”); see also Davidson, supra note 2 at 271. 
194
 The buyer side market is short of a monopoly because there are many states and 
counties who may desire private prisons.  Nonetheless, the market is necessarily limited. 
Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private Contracting 35 
 
 
enough work to go around.  In contrast, the demand for private prisons is 
not nearly as robust. 
Second, it typically requires a very large, resource rich company to 
take on the sorts of projects that fall into the “soft” services category.
195
  A 
“mom and pop” local business owner cannot realistically bid to administer 
welfare benefits for the entire state of Indiana or to operate a 1000-bed 
halfway house.  Therefore, “[t]he size and complexity of the programs 
significantly limit the number of new entrants to the market, . . . stifling the 
only source of competition[.]”
196
   
In addition, because of the nature of the services being provided and 
the requirement of large relationship-specific investments up front, 
contracts tend to be long-term.  Once a provider wins a contract and 
provides a service for a long period of time, it is even harder for other 
providers to compete.
197
  Buyers often find the costs of changing suppliers 
problematic, such that they exercise the option to switch only in extreme 
circumstances.  The first party to make the investment required to 
administer a complicated government program often gains quasi-monopoly 
advantages.
 198
  One study in Los Angeles observed that agencies typically 
renewed their contracts for family preservation programs over many cycles, 




Third, even in markets where there are multiple participants to start, 
vertical consolidation tends to happen over time.  Consolidation permits 
advantage through economies of scale.  And where there is only one buyer, 
consolidation decreases risk of losing out on a lucrative contract.
200
  
Corruption and cronyism in public-private contracting can also narrow 
markets. 
                                                 
195
 This is not always true.  For instance, there are smaller contracts to be had for social 
services, but this paper focuses on the problems that inhere in larger contracts for soft 
government services, which are pervasive. 
196
  Stevenson, supra note 21 at 91. 
197
 Rubin, supra note 180 at 919.   
198
 Walsh, supra note 129 at 35. 
199
 Elizabeth A. Graddy, and Bin Chen. Influences on the Size and Scope of Networks for 
Social Service Delivery, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 
16: 533-52 at 548-49 (2006) (“Thus, just as we find in franchise arrangements, this 
structure could create long-term contracts that begin to look like monopolies.”). 
200
 See Barbara S. Romzek, and Jocelyn M. Johnston, State Social Services Contracting: 
Exploring the Determinants of Effective Contract Accountability, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
REVIEW 65(4): 436-449 (2005); Mark Schlesinger, Robert Dorward & Richard Pulice, 
Competitive Bidding and States’ Purchase of Services: The 
Case of Mental Health Care in Massachusetts, JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND 
MANAGEMENT 5: 245-63 (1986) (describing the multiple forces encouraging consolidation 
among contractors for mental health services in Massachusetts, such as economies of scale 
in both provision and bidding); Bach, supra note 65 at 299-301; Gilman, supra note 21 at 
642. 




Whereas effective markets can help overcome principal-agent 
problems in private outsourcing, public-private contracting markets are thin.  
Markets therefore do not help constrain opportunistic behavior on the part 
of the agent as efficiency theory would suggest.
201
 
2. Specification and Monitoring Problems 
In addition to markets constraining agency costs, agency theory also 
suggests that agency costs arising between a buyer and its service provider 
should be controllable by clearly specifying performance requirements and 
benchmarks and then monitoring to ensure compliance.
 202
  These control 
mechanisms can work well in private outsourcing, however, they are 
difficult to implement in public-private contracting. 
a) Specification Difficulties 
A common complaint amongst government officials is that it can be 
difficult to “writ[e] clear contracts with specific goals against which 
contractors can be held accountable.”
203
  This is particularly true in 
contracts for soft government services: 
No matter how careful the drafter, some tasks are difficult to 
specify in contractual terms (for example, delivering quality 
health care or providing a safe environment for prisoners). 
For many important services and functions contractual 
incompleteness is inevitable.
 
 No contract can be specific 




The point is probably intuitive, but almost by their definition, soft 
government services are complicated endeavors.
205
  Particularly where tasks 




Sometimes the choice to try to define specific performance metrics 
or outcome-based goals is problematic in and of itself.  This is because 
service providers will work to comply with the requirements of the contract, 
                                                 
201
 See Walsh, supra note 129 at 35. 
202
 M.E. Warner, Mike Ballard & Amir Hefetz, Contracting Back In – When Privatization 
Fails, in THE MUN. Y.B.  35 (2003). 
203
 Gilman, supra note 21 at 600. 
204
 The Contracting State, supra note 5 at 171. 
205
 Private companies may also outsource complicated services, but lack of market 
competition and the fact that beneficiaries have limited economic and political power to 
effect good service exacerbate this problem in the public context. 
206
 Gilman, supra note 21 at 600-01; Davidson, supra note 24 at 271; Warner et al., supra 
note 202 at 30-36 (“[S]ome services are inherently hard to specify in contract.”). 
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but will ignore other elements of service quality or adherence to broader 
program goals.  This is called “shirking.”
207
 
John Donahue explains the problem with reference to education: 
The problem is that higher math test scores, fewer dropouts, 
more frequent recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance, and 
other such measurable results are not all that we expect of 
our schools.  “Education” also includes subtler factors that 
are hard to specify, harder still to monitor, and this limits the 
ability of a school district to easily choose the most attractive 
bidder among education contractors.
208
   
When it is difficult to specify quality, it only contributes to 
incentives for service providers to cut costs at the expense of quality 
because in doing so, they may not technically be violating the terms of the 
contract.
209
  A related problem is that focusing on outcomes can cause 
profit-seekers to “cream,” or select those who are easier to serve or more 
likely to be successful, avoiding the harder cases.  Accordingly, it is 
difficult to force compliance with overall service provision goals solely 
through more detailed requirements or even outcome-based rewards.
210
   
Even if goals could be adequately specified, monitoring presents 
additional hardships and costs. 
b) Difficult and Costly to Monitor 
In the absence of adequate market competition and defined 
performance standards, agency theory predicts that adequate monitoring is 
another potential substitution to force good performance.  And yet sufficient 
monitoring is seldom seen in public-private contracting.  
A 2007 study found that fewer than half of the responding municipal 
governments reported doing any monitoring.
 211
  And those who did monitor 
reported evaluating fewer aspects of contractor service than in the same 
survey conducted in 2002.
212
  Also in 2007, an analysis of municipal data 
on new contracting out and contracting back in (returning to direct 
                                                 
207
 Davidson, supra note 24 at 306 (recognizing that public law norms are inherently 
difficult to capture in contractual terms and that the risk of shirking is ever-present); see 
also Sclar, supra note 183, at 122. 
208
 John D. Donohue, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 219 (1989). 
209
 This problem is referred to in the economic literature as “shading.” 
210
 Economists refer to the difficulty of specifying quality as “non-contractability.”  See, 
e.g., http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/w2/ci/2008/pdf/07_08/july_08_ci_final_notes.pdf (specifying 
issues with performance standards in Wisconsin). 
211
 Warner & Hefetz, supra note 1; see also Dolovich, supra note 95 at 490-91 (describing 
a December 1997 survey of state and federal government agencies reporting that almost 
30% did no monitoring at all).  
212
 Warner & Hefetz, supra note 1. 
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government service provision) found that contracting back in was primarily 
associated with problems with monitoring.
 213
   
Governments lack the incentive to monitor because doing so is 
costly and may undermine the cost savings that prompted privatization in 
the first place.  While it is also costly in private outsourcing, the cost is 
more justifiable in that context where the satisfaction of the ultimate 
customer motivates the outsourcing party to monitor the service provider.  
In the private example, if customers are not satisfied, it will negatively 
affect the profitability of the outsourcer.  The same is not true in 
government outsourcing, where beneficiaries do not pay for the service and 
have limited ability to force the government to internalize the costs of poor 
service.  As a result, governments tend to under-monitor.
214
 
Also, as a practical matter, monitoring is difficult, particularly for 
soft government services that are large, complicated, and removed from the 
public eye.
215
  While government officials can make unannounced visits to 
private prisons, it would be difficult to adequately observe the goings on at 
entire institutions.  Monitoring also requires expertise, which government 
officials often lack.
216
   
The difficulties of monitoring private contractors only encourages 
governments to focus even further on cost savings rather than ensuring 
quality of service.  This move is self-perpetuating, particularly if you 
believe that companies cut costs by lowering service quality.  Governments 
essentially end up rewarding companies that choose not to invest in quality 
service. 
In sum, the mechanisms that economic theory predicts will control 
agency costs and align incentives between the government as principal and 
the private service provider as agent, are lacking in public-private 
contracting.  It is not surprising, then, that public-private contracts result in 
poor quality service provision.   
John Donohue has suggested that where tasks are difficult to 
specify, quality is difficult to assess, and there is no competitive market, it 
is simply not efficient to outsource those services.
217
  He may be correct. 
But governments are outsourcing these precise services.  In light of that 
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 See Trevor L. Brown & Matthew Potoski, Transaction Costs and Contracting: The 
Practitioner Perspective, PUBLIC PERFORMANCE & MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 28:3 at 326-51 
(March 2005) (“The easiest-to-manage services are similar to the ones with low asset 
specificity: street lot cleaning, garage and parking lot operation, cemetery maintenance, 
parking meter maintenance, vehicle towing, secretarial services, and solid-waste collection. 
Services that have low asset specificity and are easy to manage are good candidates for 
contracting out.”). 
216
 See Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through S 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1449, 1499 (2009). 
217
 See Donohue, supra note 2. 
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reality, the next Part discusses potential contract-based solutions to better 
align both the interests of (1) the government and the service beneficiaries, 
and (2) the government and the private service provider. 
IV. Proposing A Contract-Based Solution: A Mandatory Duty That 
Parties Act In Furtherance of the Public Interest 
Part III detailed a number of systematic biases that tend to cause 
government outsourcing agreements to prioritize cost savings over quality 
service provision.  Governments and private service providers fail to 
internalize the costs they impose on service beneficiaries.  Therefore, 
putting bargaining problems to the side, contracts will often be underpriced.  
This Part suggests a potential solution to force the parties to account for the 
cost of poor service provision.  Namely, the transacting parties should be 
subject to a mandatory duty to act in furtherance of the public interest, and 
service beneficiaries should be able to sue to enforce breach of the duty.   
One of the most significant problems with public-private contracting 
for soft government services is that neither the private service provider nor 
the government has a great enough incentive to ensure quality service 
provision.
218
  Relatedly, governments have difficulty controlling private 
service providers who are motivated by maximizing profit and not by 
adherence to the overall program goals.   
Typically, efficiency theory assumes that mandatory restrictions on 
contracting parties are inefficient, because parties cannot bargain around 
them when the mandatory rules impose inefficiencies.  However, as 
mentioned earlier, scholars have recognized exceptions.  For instance, 
Robert Gertner and Ian Ayres have argued that regulation in the form of 
mandatory rules may be justified to protect non-parties to the contract who 
cannot adequately protect themselves.
219
  And it is generally agreed that 
“[t]he inefficiency of the market when externalities are present can justify 
restrictions on private contracts.”
220
  These requirements will often be met 
in cases of public-private contracting, because the people who receive the 
services will typically be unable to make governments internalize their 
needs.  Therefore, a contracting restriction may be justified. 
Contract law can force the parties to internalize the cost of poor 
service provision.  It can also align the goals of the parties.  Requiring the 
parties to act in furtherance of the public interest, both in entering into 
contracts intended to benefit the public and in performing these contracts, 
will serve these ends. 
                                                 
218
 See Part III(A). 
219
 Gertner & Ayres, supra note 127 at 88.   
220
 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 120 at 30. 
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A. What Would the Public Interest Standard Require? 
The proposed public interest standard would require both 
contracting parties to take steps to provide service that is in the best 
interests of the public.  The “public interest” currently only plays a limited 
role in contract doctrine.
221
  After all, contract law is conceived of as 
“private law.”  But a public interest requirement is also not completely 
without precedent.  Government contracts tribunals have recognized that 
“because of its size, power, and potential ability to manipulate the market 
place, the Government may have obligations of fairness beyond those of the 
ordinary citizen.”
222
  And there is a doctrine of contract interpretation under 
which a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred when 
choosing among reasonable meanings of an agreement.
223
 
The concept of the “public interest” is also prevalent in certain 
regulatory regimes. For instance, the “public interest doctrine” is a central 
tenet of communications law.
224  
The doctrine is said to originate from 
English common law, where there was a principle that “businesses affected 
with the public interest” take on certain social responsibilities enforceable 
by the law.
225
  There are two historic justifications for the doctrine—that 
certain businesses exhibit a degree of monopoly control
226
 and that they 
“hold out” service to the public at large.
227
  These justifications are similar 
to those that would prompt a public interest standard in public-private 
contracting. 
There are undoubtedly objections to a public interest duty.  The first 
is that it is difficult to define.
228
  At bottom, the “public interest” standard 
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 For instance, Restatement 2
nd
 § 178 states: “A promise . . . is unenforceable on grounds 
of public policy if . . . the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the 
circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement against such terms.” 
222
 Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., Good Faith in the Termination and Formation of Federal 
Contracts, 56 MD. L. REV. 555, 556 (1997).   
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 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 207 (1981) (prioritizing considerations of 
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Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 
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Communications Act.  See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No. 104-104, 110 
Stat. 56 (1996). 
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 For an interesting account of the evolving meaning of “public interest” in 
communications policy, see William D. Rowland, Jr., The Meaning of ‘The Public Interest’ 
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COMMUNICATION LAW & POLICY 2.3: 309-328 (1997). 
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 See Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1304, 1321 (1996); Charles K. 
Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, Part I, 11 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 514, 531 (June 1911). 
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 Generally, “economists believe that markets require clear rules about property, 
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should prevent the parties from providing poor service to the intended 
service beneficiaries who are not parties to the contract.
229
  Perhaps the 
easiest way to define the requirement is by reference to examples given 
earlier in this Article.  For one, a private jail or halfway house failing to 
provide adequate security to prevent inmate escapes or to protect inmates in 
custody would be in breach of the public interest standard.  Or in the 
welfare-to-work context, failing to serve all applicants and instead 
prioritizing the easier-to-resolve cases would be a breach of the public 
interest standard.  Accordingly, the term “public” in the standard should be 
construed broadly, but with particular emphasis on the segment of the 
population most directly affected by the contract (i.e. prisoners or welfare 
beneficiaries in the examples).  Further, the “public interest” standard 
should require that the contracting parties equally serve all those who the 
service is intended to benefit. 
A related objection is that vagueness may give the courts too much 
power to decide disputes along ideological lines.
230
  But this is not 
crippling.  The purpose of inferring the public interest duty is not to 
encourage litigation where courts would be forced to parse the meaning of 
the term.
231
  Rather, it is to force better conduct from the parties in 
negotiating and performing the contract.  Parties who are required to 
promote the public interest will, in theory, be incentivized to behave better 
and to provide better service in order to avoid litigation.
 232
  Also, it is rare 
for contracts such as these to result in litigation.
233
  And there are other 
                                                                                                                            
contracts, and fraud to assure that goods and services will move to users who are willing to 
pay the highest price for them.”  Shell, supra note 125 at 500. 
229
 One admitted difficulty in defining “public interest” is that there is no universal public 
interest.  For instance, as discussed in Part III(A)(2), the taxpayers and the service 
beneficiaries have conflicting interests, although both are a part of the “public.”  But the 
point of imputing the public interest standard is to force the parties to internalize the cost of 
poor service provision to the segment of the public at whom the service is aimed.  
Therefore, transacting parties cannot satisfy the duty to further the public interest by 
appealing to the fiscal interests of taxpayers alone without addressing the need for quality 
service provision for beneficiaries. 
230
 Vagueness may also impede adequate monitoring, but as discussed in Part III(B)(2), 
monitoring is already problematic and governments are not engaging in much of it. 
231
 The threat of litigation, however, is necessary to affect behavior during contract 
performance. 
232
 This is the logic of the good faith and fair dealing requirement: imposing the mandatory 
rule will discourage the parties from acting opportunistically.  See, e.g., Burton, supra note 
127.  This Part implicitly assumes that the threat of litigation will deter the undesired 
behavior.  Although this is a common assumption, it is an area that is ripe for empirical 
assessment.   
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provision.  Permitting third-party beneficiaries to sue would likely increase litigation, at 
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contract doctrines that defy precise definition.  Good faith and fair dealing 
is one such example.
234
  Nonetheless, the good faith requirement is thought 
to serve the purpose of preventing opportunism (although it is also the 
subject of much critical literature).
235
  The concept behind the public 
interest requirement would be similar but not identical.  This is particularly 
so because the good faith requirement applies to the transacting parties, 
while the public interest duty reaches out to protect third-parties to the 
contract. 
Another potential objection is that imposing a mandatory duty 
would likely increase the cost of the contract.  Providing better service (and 
also increasing potential liability) will be costly to the service provider. The 
service provider, in turn, is likely to try to pass on at least some of that cost 
to the government.  In a sense, though, this is the desired result.  Parties to 
the agreement should be forced to internalize the cost of poor service 
provision.  If the transaction costs more, then that is what efficiency 
dictates.  If the duty increases the cost of the contract such that it is no 
longer efficient to contract out, that is an indication that contracting out was 
not the efficient choice in the first instance.
236
 
Another potential objection is the mandatory nature of the duty, 
which the next subpart considers. 
B. Why A Mandatory Duty? 
The duty to act in furtherance of the public interest should take the 
form of a mandatory duty that is implied in all government outsourcing 
contracts, just as the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied 
in all contracts.  Economically-oriented scholars generally disfavor 
mandatory or immutable rules.  The traditional justification for opposing 
mandatory rules, discussed in more detail in Part II(A)(4), is that such 
“rules are inconsistent with the commitment to party sovereignty,”
237
 as 
well as to overall efficient contracting.   
And yet there are instances where mandatory rules are necessary.  
For instance, if the contract imposes third-party effects, or is subject to 
other market failures, the parties’ choice of a contract term “might no longer 
                                                                                                                            
least to the extent that third-parties can afford to bring suit. 
234
 See Robert S. Summers, The Conceptualization of Good Faith in American Contract 
Law: A General Account, in REINHARD ZIMMERMANN & SIMON WHITTAKER 
(edited), GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 119, 196 (2000) (noting that 
no unifying meaning of good faith can be devised). 
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REV. 1449, 1504-05 (2009) (“If it is too expensive for a private company to perform public 
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 Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 25 at 609-10. 
Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private Contracting 43 
 
 
coincide with the rule that would in fact be most efficient.”
238
  Such is the 
case in public-private contracting.   
Instead of using mandatory rules, we could consider using default 
rules that remain in force unless parties decide to contract out of them. But 
this solution is troubling in the privatization context because parties would 
likely contract around the default, just as they explicitly disclaim third-party 
beneficiary suits.
239
  Permitting abrogation would defeat the purpose of 
forcing the parties to internalize the cost of poor service provision.  A 
mandatory rule would not be necessary, of course, if government 
contracting agents choose to voluntarily insert the clause into their 
contracts.  The government has the bargaining power to do it.  The concern 
is whether they have the incentive to do so.
240
 
Assuming that the duty must be mandatory, in a sense, it can be 
justified in similar terms to the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which is 
equivalent to a prohibition on opportunistic behavior.  The difference is that 
the public interest duty would prevent opportunistic behavior that 
negatively impacts third-parties, not parties to the contract.   
In addition, just as good faith is said to “save parties the cost of 
negotiating and drafting express contractual provisions that prevent 
opportunistic behavior[,]”
241
 so too would the public interest duty save the 
                                                 
238
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 Interesting literature has posited that default rules can be “sticky,” meaning that parties 
are influenced in their choices based on the choice of default.  See Russell Korobkin, The 
Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998).  
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contracts are highly regulated (in the government’s favor).  It is not a stretch to imagine 
that state legislatures would want to regulate state outsourcing contracts, as well.   
241
 Simone M. Sepe, Good Faith and Contract Interpretation: A Law and Economics 
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parties the cost of bargaining for specific contractual provisions to define 
what behavior would be in the best interests of the public.  In this vein, the 
concept of the public interest standard works particularly well in tandem 
with the suggestion made in the following subpart that contracts should be 
less specified.  Without specification, one concern is that service providers 
will take advantage and act opportunistically.
 242
  However, requiring parties 
to act in furtherance of the public interest minimizes that risk.     
C. Enforcement 
Another potential constraint of the public interest duty is that it may 
not effectively deter the imposition of costs on third-parties unless the threat 
of litigation is real.  Put another way, if neither the government nor the 
private service provider were incentivized to provide quality service under 
the old regime, neither will be incentivized to sue to enforce the duty under 
the proposed regime.  Therefore, this subpart suggests that members of the 
public for whose benefit the service was being provided—and who are 
harmed when service provision is poor—should be permitted to sue as 
third-party beneficiaries for breach of the public interest duty.
243
  
The standard (commercial) third-party beneficiary rule provides that 
a party who is not a signatory to a contract can sue to enforce the contract in 
limited circumstances.  Typically, the non-party must establish that the 
contracting parties intended to benefit him or her through the contract.
244
  
Because parties to a contract can create a right in a third person, the third-
party beneficiary rule is said to enhance judicial economy by permitting a 
direct action against the promisor.
245
 
But the standard for achieving third-party beneficiary status to a 
government contract is more stringent than the commercial contract 
standard.   It is not enough for a third party to show that the purpose of the 
government contract was to benefit the public.  Rather, the terms of the 
government contract must directly provide for liability to the third-party.
246
 
The heightened standard is usually justified on the basis that the 
government typically contracts on behalf of the entire public.  Therefore, 
almost anyone could allege standing to sue for breach of contract.  The 
typical example that is often given is that the government might contract 
with a private provider to heat a public building.  If the heat goes out and a 
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member of the public catches a cold, he should not be permitted to sue the 
heating company.  Put another way, the stricter rule is thought to prevent 
private parties who contract with the government from limitless 
litigation.
247
  It avoids the situation where private parties will choose not to 
enter into contracts with the government because of the risk of litigation. 
Under current law, then, it is very difficult for a third-party to gain 
standing to sue under a government contract.  This is particularly so where 
there is an express clause disclaiming the intention to benefit third-parties, 
as is often the case in such contracts.  “No third-party beneficiary” clauses 
are almost always controlling.
248
 
But the objections to a broader right of third-party suit under 
government contracts do not hold water, here.  First, contracts for the 
provision of soft government services generally do not affect the entire 
population, but rather a narrower segment of the population.
249
  The 
majority of the population will never be an inmate in a prison or apply for 
welfare benefits.  The segment of the population that is most affected by 
these services typically lacks financial resources (at least in the welfare and 
prison examples).  Therefore, the onslaught of litigation pictured by 
proponents of the stricter rule is unlikely.
250
 
Second, permitting third-party suits will increase the cost of the 
contract.  However, that increased cost reflects the true cost of the bargain 
between the parties.  If the increased price means the contract is no longer 
efficient for the parties to enter into the contract, then the contract should 
not be formed in the first place.
251
 
The current system (absent the mandatory duty) benefits companies 
who reduce quality to reduce cost.  Essentially, companies who underbid 
and then perform poorly win out over companies that would bid more 
accurately and then perform better.  Permitting third-party suits would 
ultimately benefit companies providing high quality services.  Companies 
usually get sued when they harm service beneficiaries.  To the extent that 
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In sum, a contract mechanism can force the parties to internalize the 
cost of poor service provision and prompt better quality service from the 
private provider.  A mandatory duty to act in the public interest will align 
the objectives of the government and the private provider and force them to 
consider the cost of poor service provision on beneficiaries.    
V. Conclusion 
Privatization advocates urge that introducing market competition 
into government services will result in both cost reduction and better quality 
service.  They argue that private providers have expertise, are better able to 
innovate, and are unconstrained by government bureaucracy.  But while 
privatizing may reduce costs, it also often results in poor quality service 
provision. 
Public law scholars have explored this problem, but their analysis is 
incomplete because it does not consider these issues from a commercial 
law, and in particular an efficiency theory, perspective.  Doing so sheds 
light on the systematic reasons for these failures.  First, the government 
does not have adequate incentive to force the service provider to provide 
quality service.  The government is caught serving two masters—the service 
recipients who want high quality service and the rest of the public that 
prefers that less be spent on such services.  The service recipients have little 
economic or political power.  Therefore the government is incentivized to 
prioritize cost cutting above all else.  Laws requiring that government 
outsourcing cut costs over government provision enforce this result.  
Government actors are also not likely to be in office long enough to see the 
effects of poor service, and even if they are, they can point their finger at 
the private service provider for errors. 
Second, even if the government were adequately concerned about 
providing high quality service, it is difficult to control the private service 
provider where competitive markets are lacking, tasks and desired outcomes 
are difficult to specify, and monitoring is both difficult and costly.  As a 
result, the contracting parties tend to impose a cost on service beneficiaries 
in the form of poor service provision.  There are inadequate mechanisms to 
force the parties to internalize this cost. 
Because these unregulated contracts are inefficient and impose costs 
similar to negative externalities, contract restrictions are necessary.  This 
Article suggests that a mandatory duty to further the public interest should 
be imposed on the parties to government outsourcing contracts.  Those who 
are harmed by poor service provision should be permitted to sue for breach 
as third-party beneficiaries to the contract.  Although state and local-level 
outsourcing agreements suffer from the effects of poor markets and agency 
costs, these problems can be addressed and abated using contract 
mechanisms. 
 
